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OWNING FRIDA KAHLO
INTRODUCTION
Her paintings demand—fiercely—that you look at her.
—Hayden Herrera1

Frida Kahlo is undoubtedly one of the most recognizable names in art
history.2 Her work epitomizes Mexican national and indigenous traditions and
is regarded as an uncompromising depiction of the female experience and form.3
But her fame goes beyond art galleries. Kahlo’s face—brooding gaze, elaborate
Mexican coiffures, and signature mono-brow—rivals the likes of Marilyn
Monroe and Elvis Presley as one of the most recognizable faces in the world.4
Captivating artists, scholars, fashion designers, and more, Kahlo is celebrated,
studied, and commodified.5 In 2001, the U.S. Postal Service placed her image
on a 34-cent stamp.6 In 2003, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences
awarded the biopic Frida two Oscars.7 In 2010, Google adorned its website with
a doodle of her face.8 She returned to the big screen in 2017 with a cameo in
Disney-Pixar’s Coco.9 In fact, one can find Kahlo on shoes, cosmetics, socks,
tequila, and even Barbie dolls.10 In 2018, Barbie manufacturer, Mattel, Inc.
1

Amy F. Collins, Diary of a Mad Artist, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2015, at 90 (citations omitted).
Jessica Stewart, Mexican Sound Library Discovers First (and Possibly Only) Voice Recording of Frida
Kahlo, MY MODERN MET (June 17, 2019), https://mymodernmet.com/frida-kahlo-voice-recording.
3
Tony Palazzolo, Women’s History Wednesday: Spotlight- Frida Kahlo, SAVING HALLOWED GROUND
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.savinghallowedground.org/single-post/2017/12/13/Womens-History-WednesdaySpotlight—Frida-Kahlo.
4
Lis Pankl & Kevin Blake, Made in Her Image: Frida Kahlo as Material Culture, 44 MATERIAL
CULTURE (Vol. 2) 1, 3 (2012). Interestingly enough both Presley and Monroe have a history with trademark law
and the courts. For specific examples of these trademark cases, see, e.g., Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v.
Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (“I knew I belonged to the Public and to the world,
not because I was talented or even beautiful but because I had never belonged to anything or anyone else”); Elvis
Presley Enterprises v. Elvisly Yours, 936 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1991).
5
See Jenny Valentish, The Commodification of Frida Kahlo: Are We Losing the Artist Under the
Kitsch?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2018/dec/29/thecommodification-of-frida-kahlo-are-we-losing-the-artist-under-the-kitsch.
6
Richard Carr, Joint Issue with Mexico Honors Artist Kahlo, SUN SENTINEL (July 1, 2001),
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2001-07-01-0106290717-story.html.
7
See The 75th Academy Awards, ACADEMY OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS AND SCIENCES (Mar. 23, 2003),
https://www.oscars.org/oscars/ceremonies/2003. For a stellar performance by Salma Hayek and a story that
takes many creative liberties regarding Kahlo’s life, see FRIDA (Lionsgate 2002).
8
See Frida Kahlo’s 103rd Birthday, GOOGLE: DOODLE (July 6, 2010), https://www.google.com/
doodles/frida-kahlos-103rd-birthday.
9
See COCO (Pixar 2017).
10
Frida Kahlo: Vault Collection, VANS, https://www.vans.com/vault-main/frida-kahlo.html (last visited
Mar. 2, 2021); Kaleigh Fasanella, Ulta Beauty Just Launches a Frida Kahlo Collection in Honor of Her Birthday,
ALLURE (July 5, 2019), https://www.allure.com/story/frida-kahlo-ulta-beauty-makeup-collection; Frida Kahlo
2
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(Mattel) announced the Frida Kahlo doll on International Women’s Day, and
immediately caused an international uproar.11
The controversy behind the manufacturing of the Frida Kahlo doll revolved
around who was entitled to use and license Kahlo’s name and image.12 On one
side, Mattel asserted it licensed Kahlo’s name and likeness from the Frida Kahlo
Corporation (FKC), the alleged owner of all rights related to Kahlo’s name and
identity in the United States.13 On the other side of the border, Kahlo’s grandniece, Mara Romeo (Mara), claimed that Mattel did not have the proper
authorization to use Kahlo’s image.14 The controversy reached a crescendo when
a judge of the Superior Court of Justice of Mexico City granted a temporary
injunction and ordered Mattel and FKC to stop using the “brand, image and work
of the illustrious painter Frida Kahlo” without permission from the owner of the
rights—Mara.15 In return, FKC sued Mara, claiming that she undermined and
defamed the company and had illegally used their Kahlo trademark.16 To
complicate matters even more, two artists filed separate lawsuits challenging the
FKC’s alleged trademark registration of Kahlo’s name and likeness the
following year in 2019.17 Both artists decided to go to court after FKC lodged
takedown orders against the e-commerce platforms hosting the artists’ work that
included Kahlo’s name and image.18

Socks, SOCK SMITH, https://www.socksmith.com/collections/frida-kahlo-socks; Frida Kahlo, TEQUILA
MATCHMAKER, https://www.tequilamatchmaker.com/brands/471-frida-kahlo; Barbie Inspiring Women Series
Frida Kahlo Doll, BARBIE, https://barbie.mattel.com/shop/en-us/ba/inspiring-women-series/barbie-inspiringwomen-series-frida-kahlo-doll-fjh65.
11
Patrick J. McDonell, Mattel Has a New Doll: Frida Kahlo Barbie. Descendants of the Artist Want It
off the Shelves, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexicofrida-20180308-story.html.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Mara Romeo (@FridaKahlo), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:39 PM), https://twitter.com/FridaKahlo/status/
971576198185783299.
15
Mara Romeo (@FridaKahlo), TWITTER (Apr. 18, 2018, 11:08 PM), https://twitter.com/FridaKahlo/
status/986803684569952256.
16
See Jillian Steinhauer, Fight over Frida Kahlo Trademark Takes a New Turn as Corporation
Countersues Her Family, ART NEWSPAPER (May 10, 2018), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/fight-overfrida-kahlo-trademark-takes-a-new-turn-as-corporation-countersues-her-family.
17
See Second Amended Declaratory Judgment Complaint at 2, Shope v. Frida Kahlo Corp., No. 1:19-cv01614-RBJ (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Shope’s Complaint]; Second Amended Declaratory
Judgment Complaint at 2, Melo v. Frida Kahlo Corp., No. 3:19-cv-05449-CRB (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020)
[hereinafter Melo’s Complaint].
18
See id. For other commentary on the lawsuits, see also, e.g., Artist Takes on Frida Kahlo Corporation
in Copyright Spat, BOODLE HATFIELD: ART LAW & MORE (June 10, 2019), https://artlawandmore.com/2019/06/
10/artist-takes-on-frida-kahlo-corporation-in-copyright-spat; Araceli Cruz, The Frida Kahlo Corporation is
Being Sued by a California-Based Artist, HIPLATINA (Jan. 28, 2020), https://hiplatina.com/frida-kahlocorporation-trademark-dispute.
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The back-and-forth between the parties raises numerous questions: When
does using a historical figure’s name become trademark infringement? What law
governs the issue—U.S. law or Mexican law? Who is the rightful trademark
owner—FKC or Mara? What issues of race and gender are uncovered in
“owning” Kahlo? And more importantly, who should own the rights to Kahlo’s
name and likeness? To answer these questions, this Comment builds on two
existing bodies of work. First, the extensive literature, across various academic
disciplines, that centers Kahlo as a vehicle of study.19 Namely, it expands on
Laurel Salisbury’s research on the litigation and commodification of Kahlo’s
trademark.20 Second, the work of legal scholars drawing on Critical Race Theory
(CRT) to study racial investments and implications of intellectual property
(IP).21 Positioned at the nexus of these two bodies of work, this Comment offers
the first CRT examination of Kahlo’s trademarks.
Part I offers a brief overview of Kahlo to contextualize the personal and
financial significance underneath the legal disputes over possessing the rights to
her name and likeness. With litigation on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border,
understanding the various parties and their respective suits sets the stage for the
rest of this Comment. Part II presents a broad overview of the theory that
undergirds trademark law. It then surveys domestic and international doctrines
of trademark law. Doing so explains how international trademark treatises
interact with a country’s domestic trademark regime. Finally, Part III offers an
introductory overview of CRT to problematize local and international trademark
law.
19
For examples of the various academic disciplines centering Kahlo, see Valmantas Budrys, Frida
Kahlo’s Neurological Deficits and Her Art, in 203 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH: THE FINE ARTS,
NEUROLOGY, AND NEUROSCIENCE: NEURO-HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 241 (Stanley Finger et al. eds., 2013)
(neuroscience); Helene B. Bernstein & Charlene Villaseñor Black, Frida Kahlo: Realistic Reproductive Images
in the Early Twentieth Century, 121 AM. J. MED. 1114 (2008) (obstetrics and gynecology); S.M.O Gradvohl &
E.R. Turato, From the Lack to the Sublimation: Psychodynamic Considerations About the Inability to Become
Pregnant by the Way of Biographical Data About Frida Kahlo, 26 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 1691 (2011) (psychiatry);
Alba F. Aragón, Uninhabited Dresses: Frida Kahlo, from Icon of Mexico to Fashion Muse, 18 FASHION THEORY
517 (2014) (fashion); Barbara Nelson, (De)Fusing the Bomb (Shell): Gender Issues, Popular Culture and Frida
Kahlo, 3 J. RES. GENDER STUD. 108 (2013) (gender studies); Nieves Limón Serrano, Frida Kahlo’s
Photographic Posing: A Theoretical Approach to Visual Autobiographies, 28 J. LATIN AM. CULTURAL STUD.
(2019) (cultural studies).
20
See Laurel Salisbury, Rolling Over in Her Grave: Frida Kahlo’s Trademarks and Commodified
Legacy, CTR. FOR ART LAW (Aug. 2, 2019), https://itsartlaw.org/2019/08/02/rolling-over-in-her-grave-fridakahlos-trademarks-and-commodified-legacy (detailing the legal controversy surrounding Kahlo’s trademark in
the aftermath of the Kahlo Barbie) [hereinafter Rolling Over in Her Grave].
21
See generally Anjali Vats & Deidre A. Keller, Critical Race IP, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 735,
740 (2018) (“[T]he interdisciplinary movement of scholars connected by their focus on the racial and colonial
non-neutrality of the laws of copyright, patent, trademark, right of publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition
using principles informed by CRT.”).
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This Comment relies on the visionary insights of critical race theorists and
is indebted to CRT, a strain of legal scholarship that challenges the ways in
which race and racial power are constructed and represented in legal culture and,
more generally, in society as a whole.22 CRT has not only challenged the
substance of legal scholarship, it has also “contest[ed] the very language of
mainstream legal and social analysis”23 arguing that a preference for neutral,
disengaged, unraced, and unsexed voices in legal scholarship reifies a baseline
that is both white and male.24 Challenging this preference, CRT embraces the
notion of “grounding a scholarly voice in the material, aesthetic, emotional, and
spiritual experiences of people of color.”25 CRT also embraces storytelling as a
way to interrogate the law and enrich the scholarly conversation.26 This
Comment does precisely that—storytelling and CRT, in practice. Accordingly,
Part III ends with a critical race analysis of international trademark law and
offers ideas to look towards the future as a starting point to inspire further
inquiry. This Comment challenges the legal structures that exacerbated Kahlo’s
commodification. Despite U.S., Mexican, and international doctrines of
trademark and ownership, no party should hold exclusive rights of Kahlo’s
trademarks. Instead, Kahlo’s name, likeness, and other trademarkable aspects
should enter the public domain.

22
KIMBERLÉ W. CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé W. Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY].
23
Id. at 314.
24
Id. at xiii (noting that CRT “rejects the prevailing orthodoxy that scholarship should be or could be
‘neutral’ and ‘objective’”).
25
Id. at 314; see also John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing
an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2147 (1992) (noting that CRT,
“at its best, creates an art style that represents a fulfillment of culture” that includes “adding our own distinctly
stylized dimensions to legal scholarship”).
26
For examples of story-driven work in CRT, see Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 416 (1987); Derrick Bell, The Space
Traders, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 158 (1992); Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989).
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FROM LA CASA AZUL TO U.S. FEDERAL COURT: THE WOMAN BEHIND THE
TRADEMARK
[He] does pretty well for a little boy, but it is I [] who am the big artist.
—Frida Kahlo27

Kahlo’s status as an icon goes beyond art history circles and expands into
fashion, Latinx, feminist, and LGBTQ+ communities as well.28 But that was not
always the case. During her life, Kahlo and her work remained relatively niche
outside of Mexico until the late 1970s.29 Part I sets the stage for the rest of this
Comment by detailing Kahlo’s humble beginnings in La Casa Azul to the current
controversy regarding her trademarks. The three sections within Part I detail
Kahlo’s life, the posthumous rise of Fridamania, and the litigation over Kahlo’s
trademark.
A. Kahlo’s Life: A Short History of the Mexican Anti-Capitalist Painter
Magdalena Carmen Frieda Kahlo y Calderón was born on July 6, 1907 in
the house of her parents, La Casa Azul, in Coyocoan, Mexico City, Mexico.30 If
asked, however, Kahlo always claimed to be born in 1910—the year the
Mexican revolution began.31 Often announcing herself as a daughter of the
revolution, Kahlo lived with a deep sense of independence and rebellion against
ordinary social and moral habits. She was moved by passion and sensuality,
27
Louis Aguilar, Iconic Frida Kahlo Before She Was an Icon, DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/entertainment/arts/2017/02/02/frida-kahlo-iconic-artist-detroitnews/97386432 (citations omitted).
28
For examples of the various works naming Kahlo as an icon, see Looking at Frida Kahlo As A Global
Icon, GOOGLE ARTS & CULTURE, https://artsandculture.google.com/theme/looking-at-frida-kahlo-as-a-globalicon/WALCrwz09w38KA?hl=en (global icon); Lauren M. Freese, Frida Kahlo and Chicana self-portraiture:
Maya Gonzalez, Yreina D. Cervantez, and Cecilia Alvarez (2013) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Iowa)
(on file with author and University of Iowa Libraries) (art history); Hayden Herrera, ART VIEW; Why Frida
Kahlo Speaks to the 90’s, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/28/arts/art-view-whyfrida-kahlo-speaks-to-the-90-s.html (fashion); Amy Funderburk, How Frida Kahlo’s Sense of Self Created an
Icon, ART & OBJECT (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.artandobject.com/articles/how-frida-kahlos-sense-selfcreated-icon (Latinx); Elisabeth Malkin, Recalling Frida Kahlo, Myth and Reality, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/arts/09iht-kahlo.1.6560761.html (feminism); Ellie Violet Bramley, Frida
Kahlo: Feminist, Selfie Queen, Queer Icon and Style Muse of 2017, GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.
theguardian.com/fashion/2017/oct/29/frida-kahlo-style-muse-of-the-year (LGBTQ+).
29
Herrera, supra note 28.
30
See, e.g., Karen Karbo, The Inconvenient Spectacle of Frida Kahlo, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 4, 2019)
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/2019/01/excerpt-frida-kahlo-artist-praise-difficult-women/#close
(explaining that Kahlo dropped the “e” in 1922.); MUSEO FRIDA KAHLO, https://www.museofridakahlo.org.mx/
en/the-blue-house (informing visitors of the history of Kahlo’s home).
31
See Judy Cox, Frida Kahlo: Artist and Revolutionary (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.counterfire.org/
articles/opinion/19792-frida-kahlo-artist-and-revolutionary.
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proud of her Mexicanidad and cultural tradition—all mixed with a particular
sense of humor.32 Unfortunately, her life was marked by physical and
psychological suffering.33
Kahlo lived with chronic pain and other ills throughout her life, which were
often incorporated in her paintings.34 She contracted polio when she was six,
which crippled her right leg leaving it shorter, smaller, and with a limp for the
rest of her life.35 In 1925, Kahlo, only eighteen at the time, was riding a bus
when it was hit by a car.36 An iron handrail pierced her stomach through her
vagina breaking both her back and pelvis and causing other severe injuries to
her body.37 Given the limited medical technology of the time, even the
treatments tortured her body including the need to wear steel orthopedic corsets
and undergo more than thirty documented surgical operations.38 Her pelvic
injury served as a prelude for her traumatic infertility.39 Kahlo had several
abortions and miscarriages, one of which caused severe hemorrhaging.40 In
1953, gangrene led to the amputation of her right leg.41 Kahlo spent the rest of
her life in a wheelchair.42 Nonetheless, Kahlo’s pain was not the only thing that
inspired her paintings.
Kahlo explained she experienced two great accidents in her life: one being
the terrible bus collision, and the other being Diego Rivera.43 A subject of great
fascination and speculation, Kahlo’s marriage to Mexican muralist Rivera was

32
Id.; see Diana Vernon, Fridamania: The Frida Kahlo Effect, CULTURE TRIP (Dec. 18, 2016),
https://theculturetrip.com/north-america/mexico/articles/fridamania-the-frida-kahlo-effect; Honestly Frida,
PBS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FRIDA KAHLO, https://www.pbs.org/weta/fridakahlo/life.
33
See Barbara Maranzani, How a Horrific Bus Accident Changed Frida Kahlo’s Life, BIOGRAPHY (Jan.
25, 2019), https://www.biography.com/news/frida-kahlo-bus-accident.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.; Collins, supra note 1.
37
See Frida Kahlo: The Palette, the Pain, and the Painter, ARTFORUM INT’L (Mar. 1983),
https://www.artforum.com/print/198303/frida-kahlo-the-palette-the-pain-and-the-painter-35514.
38
See Javier Espinoza, Frida Kahlo’s Last Secret Finally Revealed, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/12/artnews.art.
39
Gabriela Munoz, Understanding Frida Kahlo’s Fertility Problems, SCI. ILLUSTRATED (May 3, 2012),
https://scienceillustrated.com.au/blog/science/news/understanding-frida-kahlos-fertility-problems.
40
Id.; see also Pregnancy Loss and Visual Expressions of Grief: An Examination of Frida Kahlo, GOSHEN
COLL.: UNDERGRADUATE ACADS. (July 28, 2010), https://www.goshen.edu/academics/2010/07/28/pregnancyloss-and-visual-expressions-of-grief-an-examination-of-frida-kahlo.
41
See Maranzani, supra note 33; see also Brindille (@Brindille_), TWITTER (Jan. 18, 2018, 11:26 AM),
https://twitter.com/brindille_/status/954042383225774087?lang=en.
42
Timeline, PBS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FRIDA KAHLO, https://www.pbs.org/weta/fridakahlo/life.
43
Lisa W. Rogers, Frida’s First Bad Accident, LISA’S HIST. ROOM (May 26, 2009), https://
lisawallerrogers.com/2009/05/26/frida-kahlos-first-bad-accident.
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passionate, tumultuous, and intense.44 Kahlo and Rivera, then the most famous
modernist in the Americas, wed in 1929.45 Despite their marriage, Kahlo and
Rivera engaged in multiple extramarital love affairs with Rivera encouraging
Kahlo’s romantic relationships with women.46 An unorthodox union, their
marriage pushed through the jealousy and sadness despite Rivera’s infidelities
and Kahlo’s affairs with women.47 The marriage met a breaking point when
Kahlo discovered Rivera’s affair with Cristina—Kahlo’s younger sister.48 The
pair divorced in 1939.49 Even so, their mutual passion and admiration for each
other kept bringing them back to one another, and they remarried the following
year in 1940 until Kahlo’s death in 1954, at the age of 47.50
Primarily known for her many portraits and self-portraits, Kahlo channeled
her physical and emotional personal experiences into her work which often
centered symbolic portrayals of her physical and psychological wounds.51 Kahlo
also found inspiration in the nature, artifacts, and politics of Mexico.52 Kahlo’s
artwork constantly touched upon social and cultural issues intermixed with her
race and disability.53 She took her fiercely, anti-capitalistic politics and activism
and joined the Mexican Communist Party in 1927.54 Later she would even
harbor the Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky in her home.55 The political and
social meaning of Marxism and her anti-capitalistic beliefs are readily seen
within Kahlo’s 1954 Marxism Will Give Health to the Ill.56 Kahlo’s last public
44

See Frida Kahlo (Painter), AMAZING WOMEN ROCK, https://amazingwomenrock.com/frida-kahlo-

painter.
45

Frida Kahlo, BIOGRAPHY (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.biography.com/artist/frida-kahlo.
Sara Kettler, Behind Frida Kahlo’s Real and Rumored Affairs with Men and Women, BIOGRAPHY (June
19, 2019), https://www.biography.com/news/frida-kahlo-real-rumored-affairs-men-women.
47
See id.; Frida Kahlo (Painter), supra note 44.
48
Collins, supra note 1.
49
Karbo, supra note 30.
50
See Jonathan Jones, Salma Hayek on Why Frida Kahlo Was a Great Artist, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2003),
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2003/feb/14/artsfeatures1.
51
See William Grimes, In ‘Frida Kahlo: Art, Garden, Life,’ Nature Melds With the Artist Herself, N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/arts/design/in-frida-kahlo-art-garden-life-naturemelds-with-the-artist-herself.html.
52
See id.
53
See Lindsay Baker, Unlocking the Hidden Life of Frida Kahlo, BBC: DESIGNED (June 18, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20180615-unlocking-the-hidden-life-of-frida-kahlo.
54
Alexxa Gotthardt, How Frida Kahlo’s Love Affair with a Communist Revolutionary Impacted Her Art,
ARTSY (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-frida-kahlos-love-affair-communist-revolutionaryimpacted-art.
55
Id.
56
Marxism Will Give Health to the Ill, GOOGLE ARTS & CULTURE, https://artsandculture.google.com/
asset/marxism-will-give-health-to-the-ill/HAElPPnYYlxEWA?hl=en (depicting Karl Marx uplifting Kahlo in
the center, her crutches discarded in this moment as a dove is pictured in the far-left corner, contrasted with a
hand choking the neck of a bearded white man in a red, white, and blue hat, whose body is that of a chicken).
46
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appearance before her death was spent participating in a protest against U.S.
interventions in Guatemala.57 Critics have noted Kahlo’s marriage to Rivera
eclipsed her work during her lifetime, while today her work is seen as
autobiographical fact of her turbulent life rather than art.58 Others point out how
the public may recognize and love Kahlo’s face—but do not understand her
work.59 A primary reason for that is Fridamania.60
B. The Fridamania Phenomenon
Fridamania, or Fridolatry and Kahloism, generally refers to Kahlo’s
posthumous rise in popularity from cult-like status to celebrity icon.61 During
her lifetime, Kahlo was primarily known as Rivera’s exotic, colorful, and
eccentric (read: Mexican) wife.62 She gradually gained more recognition in the
late 1970s when feminist scholars began to question the exclusion of female and
non-Western artists from the art historical canon and when the Chicano
Movement lifted her as one of its icons.63
Two events were instrumental to Fridamania and raising the general public’s
interest in Kahlo’s life and art outside of Mexico. The first was a 1982 joint
retrospective of her paintings and Tina Modotti’s photographs at the
Whitechapel Gallery in London.64 The second was the publication of art
historian Hayden Herrera’s international bestseller, Frida: A Biography of Frida
Kahlo in 1983.65 By 1984, Kahlo’s reputation as an artist had grown to such
extent that Mexico declared her works part of the national cultural heritage,
prohibiting their export from the country.66 Fridamania raised the popularity of
57
Frida Kahlo’s Art Through the Lens of Magical Realism, 1000MUSEUMS (June 1, 2020), https://www.
1000museums.com/frida-kahlo-art-magical-realism.
58
See Jones, supra note 50.
59
See Sebastian Smee, You Might Think You Know Frida Kahlo, But You’ll Never Understand Her Pain,
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/you-might-think-youknow-frida-kahlo-but-youll-never-understand-her-pain/2019/02/14/1509f868-2e4e-11e9-813a-0ab2f17e305b_
story.html.
60
See Pankl & Blake, supra note 4, at 1; Vernon, supra note 32.
61
Pankl & Blake, supra note 4, at 1; Vernon, supra note 32.
62
See Emily Green, As Mexico Capitalizes on Her Image, Has Frida Kahlo Become OverCommercialized?, NPR (June 2, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/02/616129555/as-mexico-capitalizes-onher-image-has-frida-kahlo-become-over-commercialized; Gannit Ankori, Frida Kahlo: Fashioning Her Self in
San Francisco, DE YOUNG MUSEUM (Feb. 25, 2020), https://deyoung.famsf.org/fashioning-her-self.
63
Pankl & Blake, supra note 4, at 1.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Decreto por el que se Declara Monumento Artístico toda la obra de la Artista Mexicana Frida Kahlo
Calderón, Incluyendo la obra de Caballete, la obra Gráfica, los grabados y los documentos técnicos, sean
Propiedad de la Nación o de Particulares, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 25-07-1984 (Mex.); see also
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Kahlo’s biography, work, and image through the 1980s and into the 1990s.67 It
has since taken a life of its own.
Fridamania slowly transformed Kahlo’s image into a commodity, void of
her life story, her politics, and her disability. A feminist, anti-capitalist, queer,
disabled, gender fluid, revolutionary, Kahlo is routinely stripped down to a
subdued, able-bodied, feminized, and whitened ideal of feminism for mass
consumption that stands in direct opposition to both her life and artistic
endeavors.68 For example, Theresa May sported a Kahlo bracelet and confused
onlookers considering May, the Conservative Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom at the time, held drastically different views to Kahlo’s fierce Marxist
and later Stalinist beliefs.69 Further erasing Kahlo’s lived experience,
Hollywood packaged Salma Hayek in a hypersexualized portrayal of Kahlo as a
tango-dancing flirt, while Coco depicted Kahlo as a performance artist dotty
about working with oversize fruits.70 In fact, the issue Mara raised over the
Kahlo Barbie centered on Mattel’s erasure of Kahlo’s race, disability, and
androgynous features.71 Accordingly, parties are fighting for more than Kahlo’s
trademarks and licensing rights—they are fighting for her legacy.
C. The Litigation over Kahlo’s Trademark
Kahlo died intestate in La Casa Azul, paving the way for the current legal
dispute.72 According to Mexican Industrial Property law, Kahlo’s niece, Isolda
Pinedo Kahlo (Isolda), inherited Kahlo’s IP rights in her capacity as the third

CCP Staff, Mexico: Art in the Time of Restrictive Export Laws, CULTURAL PROP. NEWS (July 4, 2018),
https://culturalpropertynews.org/mexico-art-in-the-time-of-restrictive-export-laws.
67
See Tess Thackara, How Frida Kahlo Became a Global Brand, ARTSY (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.
artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-frida-kahlo-global-brand.
68
A search engine query for “Frida Kahlo” reveals many examples. See, e.g., Frida Kahlo Endure More
Girls Ringer T-Shirt, HOT TOPIC, https://www.hottopic.com/product/frida-kahlo-endure-more-girls-ringer-tshirt/10784606.html (“Frida Kahlo Endure More Girls Ringer T-Shirt [] $7.99”); Frida Kahlo Graphic Tee,
FOREVER 21, https://www.forever21.com: frida kahlo graphic tee (last visited Mar. 2, 2020) (“Frida Kahlo
Graphic Tee [] $8.00”).
69
See, e.g., Morwenna Ferrier, Was Theresa May’s Frida Kahlo Bracelet a Political Statement?,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/04/was-theresa-mays-frida-kahlobracelet-a-political-statement (questioning May’s motives for the choice of bracelet); Hannah Jane Parkinson
(@ladyhaja), TWITTER (Oct. 4, 2017, 8:34 AM), https://twitter.com/ladyhaja/status/915570818876362752
(noting the irony of May’s choice of bracelet). See generally Isabella Gomez Sarmiento, Frida Kahlo: Radical
Artist, Political Activist, Icon, TEEN VOGUE (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/frida-kahloradical-artist-political-activist-icon (detailing Kahlo’s ideological perspectives).
70
COCO (Pixar 2017).
71
See McDonell, supra note 11.
72
Complaint at 3, Frida Kahlo Corp. v. Romeo Pinedo, 1:18-cv-21826 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2018)
[hereinafter FKC’s Complaint].
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“degree” in the collateral line of succession.73 In 2003, Isolda’s daughter, Mara,
was granted power of attorney over Isolda’s legal affairs, including the Kahlo’s
rights to publicity.74 This right is especially important for someone like Kahlo
whose recognition stems largely from her distinctive appearance, which served
as the subject matter for much of her art.75 This Section expands on FKC’s legal
disputes with both Mara and the artists suing FKC. First, it presents a brief
history of Mara’s relationship with FKC. Then it explains FKC’s lawsuits related
to Mara before discussing the artists’ litigious responses to FKC’s takedown
orders.
1.

How Mara Met FKC

Kahlo’s right of publicity expired in 2004, the same year FKC formed.76
Isolda and Mara entered a working relationship with businessman Carlos
Dorado, owner of FKC.77 Dorado learned of Frida Kahlo when one of his
employees wore a flannel shirt with, what Dorado described as, “a very ugly
woman, with eyebrows joined[.]”78 After asking about the “ugly woman,” his
employee explained that it was the face of Kahlo and mentioned Salma Hayek’s
Frida.79 Dorado and his wife went to see the film and he claimed the film made
a huge impression upon him.80 Dorado then visited La Casa Azul where he met
Isolda and convinced the family to let him commercialize Kahlo.81 Mara and her
family offer a different story. According to Mara, any transfer of rights to FKC
was not a complete transfer.82 Rather, FKC and the family were supposed to
work together to mutually approve of any products bearing Frida Kahlo’s name

73
Mexico uses the term Industrial Property to categorize laws protecting patents, utility models,
industrial designs, and trademarks but it is not the legal equivalent of U.S. Intellectual Property law. See
Reglamento de la Ley de la Propiedad Industrial [RLPI] sec. XII, art. 90, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
25-06-1991, últimas reformas DOF 28-06-2010 (Mex.) [hereinafter Mexican Industrial Property Law].
74
FKC’s Complaint, supra note 72, at 4.
75
See Rebecca Kleinman, Frida Kahlo Was a Painter, a Brand Builder, a Survivor. And So Much More.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/arts/design/frida-kahlo-booklyn-museum.
html (emphasizing how Kahlo’s art centered the subject she knew best—herself).
76
See Shope’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 5.
77
See Mariana Garcia, Frida Kahlo Corporation, GLOB. OPINIONS (Jan. 1, 2017), https://archive.fo/
i3yNF#selection-1853.1-1853.24.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
See Sonia Sierra, Legal Battle over Frida Kahlo Brand, EL UNIVERSAL (Sept. 6, 2017),
http://archive.is/bUtTP#selection-1989.0-1989.35.
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and image.83 FKC would provide the resources and the know-how, and Mara
would provide the name.84 Mara claims she never sold any rights to FKC.85
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has records of
registration belonging to Isolda of the “Frida Kahlo” name for use in a wide
variety of commercial circumstances.86 Representing her mother, Mara legally
transferred the existing U.S. trademark registrations to FKC.87 As such, FKC
registered all subsequent U.S. registrations of Frida’s name, signature, initials,
and slogans.88 Meanwhile, the Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI),
Mexico’s trademark office, has most of Frida’s trademarks registered to FKC
but many registrations are also held in Mara’s name.89 At some point in 2011,
the working relationship between FKC and Mara began deteriorating.90

2. FKC Sues the Kahlo Family
Four years later, Mattel’s Kahlo Barbie publicly pit FKC and Mara against
one another.91 Despite Mara’s outcry, Mattel maintained that they worked
closely with FKC to develop an authentic representation of Kahlo.92 As noted
earlier, Mara pursued her grievance in Mexico claiming FKC exceeded their
rights in licensing the use of Kahlo’s name without the family’s approval.93 The
Superior Court of Justice of Mexico City agreed and issued a temporary
injunction to stop Mattel’s sales of the doll in Mexico.94 Controlling the social
media accounts under Kahlo’s name, Mara posted a letter addressed to the
public, written in Spanish and English, stating that a decree was issued against
FKC requiring them to refrain from using Kahlo’s brand, image, and work in
any commercialization of products without the family’s consent.95 In response,
83

Id.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Rolling Over in Her Grave, supra note 20. See generally Notice of Opposition at 51–62, Frida Kahlo
Corp. v. Romeo Pinedo, No. 91254969 (T.T.A.B. 2020).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See Frida Kahlo Trademarks in Mexico, MARCARIA: TRADEMARK SEARCH, https://trademark-search.
marcaria.com/en (press the “Mexico” box; then search for “Frida Kahlo”).
90
Rolling Over in Her Grave, supra note 20. See generally FKC’s Complaint, supra note 71, at 5.
90
Id.
91
McDonell, supra note 11.
92
Id.
93
See Agencies in Mexico City, Mexican Court Blocks Sales of Frida Kahlo Barbie Doll, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2018/apr/20/frida-kahlo-barbie-doll-mexico-injunction.
94
Id. Sales in the United States were unaffected. Rolling Over in Her Grave, supra note 20.
95
Mara Romeo (@FridaKahlo), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:39 PM), https://twitter.com/FridaKahlo/status/
971576198185783299.
84
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FKC brought suit against Mara.96 FKC asserted a number of claims under the
Lanham Act and commercial defamation.97
During the litigation mentioned above, FKC initiated another lawsuit, this
time against a Mexican corporation: VersaLicensing.98 On July 16, 2019,
VersaLicensing responded by filing a motion to dismiss the case.99 In its motion,
VersaLicensing stated that it received Mara’s authorization to license the brand
in Mexico, where Mara possess trademark registrations separate from FKC.100
On January 17, 2020, both parties filed a stipulation of dismissal and the court
dismissed the case three days later.101 Nonetheless, there is ongoing litigation
between FKC and Mara in Mexico on the matter of who rightfully owns the
trademarks there.102

96
97

See Rolling Over in Her Grave, supra note 20. See generally FKC’s Complaint, supra note 72, at 1.
See Rolling Over in Her Grave, supra note 20
(The Corporation asserted a number of claims including trademark infringement and unfair
competition under the Lanham Act and commercial defamation. FKC claims it is the absolute
owner of all trademark rights to the Frida Kahlo name in the U.S., EU, and Mexico . . . FKC
maintains that the trademarks are valid because they are “distinctive” and “famous,” and claims
that Mara’s use of the trademarks on the Frida Kahlo social media pages and website constitute
infringement. FKC also claims Mara’s public notices against FKC are slanderous and harmful to
the brand, and constituted tortious interference with a business relationship, primarily FKC’s
relationship with Mattel.).

98

Rolling Over in Her Grave, supra note 20
(The suit alleged contributory trademark infringement, false designation of origin, false
advertisement, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and common law. In this complaint,
FKC alleges that Mara and Romeo, have together and under their company, “Familia Kahlo,”
“embarked on a campaign to misappropriate the rights” owned by FKC. As a part of that
“campaign,” FKC alleges, the Family ‘engaged [VersaLicensing] to further their plan of
undermining the legitimacy and validity of the FKC Trademarks.’ FKC claims VersaLicensing,
on its website and through promotional materials, purported to represent the trademark of Frida
Kahlo’s signed initials, ‘FK,’ a trademark which is registered to FKC in the U.S. The ‘FK’ brand
has since been removed from VersaLicensing’s website. As for relief, FKC again seeks
compensatory damages in an amount greater than $75,000, a declaration that FKC is the proper
trademark holder, and injunctions against VersaLicensing’s continued use of, or association with,
the Frida Kahlo name and brand.)

(citations omitted). See generally Complaint, Frida Kahlo Corp. v. VersaLicensing, 1:19-cv-22258-MGC (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 13, 2019).
99
Rolling Over in Her Grave, supra note 20. Motion to Dismiss at 1, Frida Kahlo Corp. v.
VersaLicensing, 1:19-cv-22258-MGC (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2019).
100
Id.
101
Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Frida Kahlo Corp. v. VersaLicensing, 1:19-cv-22258-MGC (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 13, 2019); Order of Dismissal at 1, Frida Kahlo Corp. v. VersaLicensing, 1:19-cv-22258-MGC (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 13, 2019).
102
Rolling Over in Her Grave, supra note 20. See generally Motion to Dismiss, supra note 99, at 2.
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3. Artists Sue FKC
The remaining cases involve two artists filing separate lawsuits against FKC.
On June 5, 2019, folk-artist Nina Shope sued FKC.103 Shope filed her suit after
FKC sent a takedown notice of intellectual property infringement to Etsy, an
online arts and crafts retailer, where Shope sells her artwork.104 Shope
handmakes a variety of embroideries and dolls, many of which represent Kahlo
and are sold using Kahlo’s name.105 FKC submitted the notice against several of
Shope’s dolls, which resulted in automatic removal of her Kahlo listings.106
Shope asserted that her creations did not constitute trademark infringement
because her use of Kahlo’s name was merely descriptive of the subject matter of
her creations.107 Furthermore, she argued the use of the name, Kahlo, in
conjunction with the doll is not source-identifying.108 In other words, because
she used the name to identify a historical figure, consumers would not assume
the dolls were associated with FKC. On March 5, 2020, Shope and FKC filed a
joint motion to stay and vacate scheduling order to attempt to settle.109 On April
1, 2020, Shope requested a dismissal of her complaint, which the court granted
the next day.110 While FKC settled the case with Shope, the company currently
faces similar legal challenges from another artist in court.
After FKC continually demanded takedown of her art on eBay, Etsy, Zazzle,
and Redbubble, artist Cristine Melo sued FKC on August 29, 2019.111 Melo has
supported herself by selling her artwork on eBay since 2001, on Etsy since 2005,
Zazzle since 2009, and Redbubble since 2015.112 Melo claimed she had painted
portraits of Kahlo years before FKC’s formation and long before “Frida Kahlo”
was trademarked.113 Seeking almost identical relief to Shope, Melo additionally
sought an injunction, which she filed on February 18, 2020.114 As of April 5,
2021, the parties are attempting to work out the language of a settlement.115
103

Shope’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 1.
Rolling Over in Her Grave, supra note 20. See generally Shope’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 9.
105
Shope’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 5, 6.
106
Id. at 9, 10.
107
Id. at 11.
108
Id. at 10, 11.
109
See Shope v. Frida Kahlo Corporation, No. 1:19-cv-01614 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 5, 2019) (LEXIS).
110
See id.; Rule 41 Dismissal at 1, Shope v. Frida Kahlo Corp., No. 1:19-cv-01614 -RBJ (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Apr. 1, 2020). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.
111
See id. at 3; Melo v. Frida Kahlo Corporation et al., No. 3:19-cv-05449 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2019)
(LEXIS).
112
Melo’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 5.
113
Melo’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 4.
114
Compare Melo’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 41, with Shope’s Complaint, supra note 17.
115
See Melo v. Frida Kahlo Corporation et al., No. 3:19-cv-05449 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2019) (LEXIS).
104
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With an understanding of Kahlo’s biography, her significance, and the
resulting litigation, Part II introduces varying doctrines of local and international
trademark law to examine what law impacts FKC, Mara, the artists, and Kahlo’s
trademarks.
II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRADEMARK LAW
Of my face I like the eyebrows and eyes.

—Frida Kahlo116

Trademarks have existed in various capacities over the past millennia.117 For
a deeper understanding of the arguments revolving Kahlo’s trademarks, it is
crucial to first understand what a trademark is. In its simplest form, a trademark
is an “arbitrary or representative device attached to or sold with merchandise”
with the purpose to help consumers identify the source of a product to
distinguish similar and competing products.118 The Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) defines a trademark as “any sign, or any
combination of signs, capable of distinguishing goods or services of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings[.]”119 Under the U.S. Lanham Act,
a trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination[,]” used
to identify and distinguish goods from those manufactured or sold by others.120
Today, nearly anything capable of carrying meaning can serve as a trademark.121
In return, trademark law protects trademarks and their holders from unfair
competition.122
Part II undertakes Tanya Hernandez’s123 call to push CRT to focus on
comparative law and contribute to the existing corpus of work that incorporates
116

Collins, supra note 1 (citations omitted).
See Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127, 127 (1955) (tracing the
historical original of trademarks starting in 5000 B.C. through the 18th century). For an insightful history of
trademarks, see Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265
(1975).
118
See Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 491–92 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886). But see Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football
Club plc v. Reed, 2002 E.T.M.R. 82 (Colomer, R.) (holding that that the function of trademarks should not be
limited to the indication of origin).
119
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 15(1), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
120
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127
121
See Qualitex v. Jacobsen, 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1998); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 119 (mandating
protection for all types of signs provided they are capable of distinguishing).
122
See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1839,
1840 (2007).
123
Professor Hernandez is the Archibald R. Murray Professor of Law at Fordham University School of
117
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a comparative law component into CRT and the associated endeavor of applying
CRT to non-U.S. legal jurisdictions.124 In doing so, Part II offers an introductory
survey of the harmonization between local and international trademark law.
Section A addresses the difference between trademarks and other forms of
intellectual property. Section A also explains the theoretical justifications behind
trademarks and examples of attempts to harmonize trademark law amidst a
global economy. With that foundation, Section B presents the trademark
doctrines of the European Union, United States, and Mexico.
A. Trademark Law’s General Themes
Although trademark law is often considered the broader intellectual property
scheme, like patent and copyright law, trademark law is inherently different.125
Generally, patent and copyright law are both incentive-based systems.126 For
example, an individual uses ingenuity to create a patentable or copyrightable
item that benefits the rest of society and in return society rewards the individual
a limited-duration monopoly to monetize that item.127 In theory, the reward
incentivizes the individual’s ingenuity to create.128 Therefore, patent and
copyright laws encourage innovation as a whole.129 Conversely, trademark law
is not based on an incentive principle between society and an individual.130
Rather, trademark law improves the quality of information in the marketplace,
thereby reducing consumer search costs and ensuring competitors do not take
producers’ marks.131 Despite differences in trademark law jurisprudence, this

Law and the co-director of the Center on Race, Law & Justice where she is the head of global and comparative
law programs and initiatives. See MULTIRACIALS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: MIXED RACE STORIES OF DISCRIMINATION,
https://multiracialsandcivilrights.wordpress.com/about.
124
Tanya K. Hernandez, The Value of Intersectional Comparative Analysis to the Post-Racial Future of
Critical Race Theory: A Brazil-U.S. Comparative Case Study, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1407, 1410 (2011). For other
work situated at the intersection of CRT and comparative law, see generally Francisco Valdes, Foreword:
Latinalo Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From
Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 1–11 (1996); Enrique R. Carrasco, Critical Race Theory and
Development, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 427 (1997); Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International
Law: Convergence and Divergence: Racing American Foreign Policy, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’ L. PROC. 260 (2000);
Tanya K. Hernandez, Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A Transnational Critical Race Theory Approach,
63 LA. L. REV. 875, 881–86 (2003).
125
See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1885, 1886–
87 (2011).
126
Id. at 1893.
127
Id. at 1894–95.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
But see id. at 1887 (arguing that trademark law can encourage creativity without an incentive system).
131
Id.

ALBARRÁN_4.28.21

642

5/10/2021 2:15 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

purpose is generally shared around the world.132 This is not to say that all
countries hold these definitions and their applicability to practice to the same
degree.133 There are two overarching common themes: territoriality and market
protections.
Trademark protection is territorial, acquired and protected on a country-bycountry basis.134 Local trademark instruments and international trademark
agreements recognize the territoriality of trademark law.135 In fact, intellectual
property regimes, in general, focus on rewarding local creators at the expense of
foreigners.136 The 1709 Statute of Anne—the first British copyright law—
provides a great example of this bias considering the British parliament enacted
the Statute of Anne for the benefit of domestic publishers.137 Although countries
have amended or drafted new laws over time, the guiding principle remains the
territorial application of intellectual property rights.138 Naturally, these
principles also emerged in trademark law.
Despite all this, trademarks in modern legal regimes transcend their
territoriality and have acquired a degree of internationalism.139 As a result, the
territorial nature of contemporary trademark law no longer confines a state to a
specific territorial jurisdiction.140 Recent examples include the trademark rights
recognized under a pair of 2015 E.U. laws, which brought substantial changes
to harmonize the national trademark systems of E.U. member states.141 These
developments expanded the territorial nature of trademark law into an intricate
mix of contemporary legal and universal characteristics, blurring the lines

132
See L.M. VanHoozer, International Trademark Law, 42 MISS. L.J. 178, 178 (1971) (stating the general
functions of trademarks in an international arena).
133
See Burkhart Goebel, Trademarks as Fundamental Rights - Europe, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 931, 954
(2009) (tracing the concept of a trademark as a fundamental right, which is not the case in many countries).
134
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Territorial Overlaps in Trademark Law: The Evolving European Model, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1669, 1673–74 (2017).
135
See id. at 1674 (“[TRIPS] . . . has not interfered with the purity of territoriality as a legal proposition.”)
136
Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
1, 8 (1998).
137
Id. See generally 8 Anne. C. 19 (1710).
138
Dinwoodie, supra note 134, at 1673–74.
139
Cf. P. Sean Morris, From Territorial to Universal—The Extraterritoriality of Trademark Law and the
Privatizing of International Law, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 33, 35 (2019) (“Intellectual property rights
used to be territorial in nature, but in modern legal regimes, they have transcended their territoriality and
appeared to have acquired internationalism.”).
140
Id.
141
See Directive 2015/2436, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Dec. 16, 2015 to
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, O.J. (L 336/1); Council Regulation
207/2009 of Feb. 22, 2009 on the Community Trade Mark, O.J. (L 78/1), as amended by Regulation (EU)
2015/2424, O.J. (L 341/21) (2015).
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between private and public international law—for better and for worse.142
Because of their global scope, trademarks move with the goods they are affixed
to, allowing them to cross borders into different localities.143 Some have called
this the globalization of trademark law.144 Fueled by globalization and recent
trademark law developments, some envisioned an inevitable progression toward
a centralized, harmonized, unification of a “new world” of international
trademark law.145 Despite the harmonization of some jurisdictions like the
European Union, the territorial nature of trademark law remains.146 It is this
territorial nature that prevented Mattel from selling the Kahlo Barbie in Mexico.
Generally, trademark law protects and benefits both producers and
consumers in the market.147 Historically, trademarks became legitimized
through two historical uses.148 First, merchants would affix marks on their goods
so that they would be able to identify and retrieve their own goods after
shipping.149 Second, guilds would often require a regulatory production mark to
be placed upon certain goods so that defective goods could be traced to their
originator and such individuals could be punished.150 Despite its history,
trademark law has generally become more preoccupied with protecting
producers’ investment in a mark to stimulate and enhance commercial activity
and fair dealing.151 Trademarks may have developed to serve consumers by
reducing search costs and allowing buyers to make rational purchasing decisions
but now trademarks do even more.152 The products consumers buy are embedded
with increasing intangible information that consumers largely do see—but
feel.153 In commercial environments, trademarks operate as a convenient
symbolic “shorthand” that provides information or influences consumers in the

142
Morris, supra note 139, at 35. But see McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005), at 118–
19 (“[T]he domestic effect of the international activities may be of lesser importance . . . [T]here is a risk that
absent a certain degree of extraterritorial enforcement, violators will either take advantage of international
coordination problems or hide in countries without efficacious antitrust or trademark laws . . .”).
143
Morris, supra note 139, at 36.
144
See Leaffer, supra note 136, at 2.
145
Id.
146
Dinwoodie, supra note 134, at 1674.
147
Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2100 (2004).
148
See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 814
(1927).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
See McKenna, supra note 122, at 1849–50; see also Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the
Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs”, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605, 605 (2007).
152
See William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON.
265, 269–70 (1987).
153
Id.
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most efficient manner.154 For example, a Kate Spade satchel will convey a
different affect on consumers compared to a near identical satchel from
Chico’s.155 Likewise, Kahlo refrigerator magnets convey a different affect on
consumers compared to fruit refrigerator magnets. The same applies to the
countless items with Kahlo’s name and face. These intangible and unobservable
features account for even greater value in products.156
Many scholars agree that trademarks have long transcended their basic role
of identifying the source of products and have been transformed into an
economic asset in their own right.157 While a trademark’s function was originally
limited to guaranteeing its origin and ensuring the quality of products bearing
the mark, over the years trademarks have transformed into tools of advertising
and marketing.158 This shift has continued with trademark law moving away
from protecting consumer interests and toward protecting producers’ property
interests.159 Similarly, trademark law has shifted to treat trademarks as
property.160 For example, many famous marks have acquired an independent
commercial status that is distinct from the respective goods or services that they
cover.161 Accordingly, producers need speed, certainty, and efficiency in seeking
and maintaining their rights across international jurisdictions. The push for these
safeguards became the motivating factor behind international attempts to
harmonize jurisdictions with international solutions.162 For example, the Paris
Convention puts geographical indicators in the context of protecting unfair
154

Id. at 269.
Compare Margaux Large Satchel, KATE SPADE, https://www.katespade.com/products/margaux-largesatchel/098687313230.html?cgid=ks-handbags-view-all (last visited Mar. 2, 2021), with Black Aurora Satchel,
CHICO’S, https://www.chicos.com/store/product/pixie+mood+black+aurora+satchel/570292936?color=001&
catId=cat40029 (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
156
See Landes & Posner, supra note 152, at 266. How Latinx and other racialized consumers maneuver
their social values and ideologies through purchasing Kahlo products lies outside of this comment’s legal
inquiry. Cf. RACHEL V. GONZÁLEZ, QUINCEAÑERA STYLE: SOCIAL BELONGING AND LATINX CONSUMER
IDENTITIES 4 (2019) (examining this through Quiceañeras).
157
McKenna, supra note 122, at 1906 (“These types of cases treat a trademark itself as the exclusive
property of a mark owner.”).
158
See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law, 38 N.M. L. REV. 1
(2008) (detailing the transformation of trademark law).
159
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687,
1693–94 (1999); see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 371–72 (1999); see also
McKenna, supra note 122, at 1873–74.
160
See generally Adam Mossoff, Trademark as a Property Right, 107 KY. L.J. 1 (2018) (explaining that
trademarks have moved away from their origin and now resemble independent property rights like a fee simple
in land or title in a patent).
161
See Steven M. Cordero, Cocaine-Cola, the Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending the Trademark
and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 599 (1998).
162
See Katherine Beckman & Christa Pletcher, Expanding Global Trademark Regulation, 10 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 215 (2010).
155
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competition among marks, and it implies that it will not recognize a geographical
indication if it creates the likelihood of deception or confusion.163
A U.S. case offers a stark reminder about the limits of international law even
when countries are party to international conventions, such as the Paris
Convention.164 In Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., the court explained that the
Paris Convention protected a U.S. trademark owner, the plaintiff, against unfair
competition and trademark infringement in Canada under Canadian law and in
the United States under U.S. law.165 The Paris Convention did not create a
private right under local law for acts of unfair competition occurring in foreign
countries.166 There are other circumstances in which a nation has the power to
handle issues that can be international in nature, but the national courts are often
the main port of call at which state treaty obligations are interpreted through the
use of domestic legislation.167
Despite this lack of harmonization, the formation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and TRIPS in 1994 expanded trademark regulation.168
TRIPS serves as a guideline for trademark use and recognition by the 164 current
WTO members.169 To date, this is considered the most comprehensive and
sweeping regulation of trademarks, reaching all corners of the globe.170 TRIPS
establishes a set of rules that Member States must transpose into their domestic
intellectual property law systems.171 The TRIPS agreement was administered
and created to set basic standards for various parts of intellectual property
regulations.172 Essentially, the WTO deals with rules of trade between Member
States at a global or near-global level.173 It helps trade flow as freely as possible,
163
Deborah J. Kemp & Lynn M. Forsythe, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: A Case of
California Champagne, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 272, 273 (2006).
164
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
165
Id. at 640–41.
166
Id. at 640.
167
See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial
Function of National Courts, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 133, 151 (2011). See generally ANDRE
NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (2011) (exploring how explores
how domestic courts contribute to the maintenance of the rule of international law by providing judicial control
over the exercises of public powers that may conflict with international law).
168
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 119.
169
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: UNDERSTANDING THE WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
170
Beckman & Pletcher, supra note 162.
171
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 119.
172
Enforcement and Protection, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: UNDERSTANDING THE WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm.
173
What is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: UNDERSTANDING THE WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm.
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which is vital for a nation’s economic development and well-being.174
Accordingly, the WTO is obligated to “remov[e] obstacles” and “ensur[e] that
individuals, companies and governments know what the trade rules are around
the world, and giv[e] them the confidence that there will be no sudden changes
of policy.”175 The purpose of the TRIPS agreement is to limit the number of
hindrances and confusion regarding international trade while promoting proper
protection to trademarks and intellectual property rights as a whole.176
Additionally, TRIPS serves to recognize and acknowledge underlying public
policy objectives of various national systems for the purposes of intellectual
property protection.177
Despite the harmonization of trademark law’s policy objectives, global
trade—especially the online marketplace—has highlighted the growing gap
between the market’s global reach and trademark law’s restricted national
scope.178 While trademark law’s de facto territorial nature has not hindered
developments of international harmonization and cohesion, gaps remain.179
Kahlo’s trademarks reside in these gaps between local law and international
commerce. Despite their inherent limitations, these international doctrines
highlight a general consensus to accept patterns of consistency in trademark law.
A fitting example highlighting the harmonization of trademark law policies
include the concepts of functionality and distinctiveness.
B. Functionality and Distinctiveness in the European Union, the United
States, and Mexico
The concepts of functionality and distinctiveness are integral to trademark
law and derive from the general shared themes of trademark law around the
world. While there are numerous similarities and differences in the application
of trademark laws in the European Union, United States, and Mexico, the focus
on functionality and distinctiveness is purposeful. Trademark law in these
jurisdictions all recognize functionality and distinctiveness as either refusals for
a mark’s registration or challenges to a mark’s validity, and utilize these
concepts in determining whether to cancel a mark. Understanding these concepts
is crucial to examine one example of what trademark examiners are tasked with

174
175
176
177
178
179

See id.
Id.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 119.
Id.
See Morris, supra note 139, at 53.
Id.
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in their roles as gatekeepers.180 Accordingly, this Section briefly discusses the
respective trademark jurisprudence of the European Union, United States, and
Mexico.
1. European Union Trademark Law181
In the member states of the European Union, national trademark law and
E.U. trademark law co-exist.182 Each E.U. member state has its own national
trademark law, such as the German Trademarks Act, Markengesetz (MarkenG),
the U.K. Trade Marks Act 1994, or France’s Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle
(CPI).183 The 2015 legislative changes to E.U.’s trademark law harmonized the
European Union by approximating, supplementing, or replacing the domestic
trademark law of each individual E.U. member state regarding secondary
liability for trademark infringement.184 In order to ensure a uniform application
of the Directive, and in accordance with Article 267 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, any domestic court of an E.U. member state
that needs to interpret a provision in national trademark law that is based on the
new legislation may request the European Union’s Court of Justice (E.C.J.) to
give a ruling.185 Nevertheless, even with a legal framework primed for
harmonization, limitations still arise.186

180

Infra Part III.B.
For an in-depth examination of the meaning and policies underlying the settled E.U. approach to
analyzing inherent distinctiveness claims for product trade dress marks, see Dr. César J Ramírez-Montes, The
Elusive Distinctiveness of Trade Dress in EU Trademark Law, 34 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 277 (2020).
182
Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, EUROPEAN COMMISSION: TRADE MARK
PROTECTION IN THE EU, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/intellectual-property/trade-markprotection_en.
183
See Gesetz über den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen [Markengesetz] [German Trade
Mark Act], Oct. 25, 1994, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 3082 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/markeng/; Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26 (U.K.); CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PRO.
INTELL.] art. L711-17, R712-18 (Fr.), http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT
000006069414&dateTexte=20100814.
184
Council Regulation 2017/1001, arts. 4, 7(1) O.J. (L 154) 1 [hereinafter EUTMR] (defining E.U.
trademark and absolute grounds for refusal); Council Directive 2015/2436, arts. 3, 4(1) O.J. (L 336) 1
[hereinafter TMD].
185
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
186
For example, some of the E.U. eBay court decisions refer to both national and Community Trade
Marks, others to national trademarks only ignoring the E.U. legislation. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, 172 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN
[BGHZ] 119 (Ger.) (Internet-Versteigerung II); L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, [2009] EWHC 1094 (Ch) (Eng.);
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [Ordinary Court of Original Jurisdiction] Troyes, ch. civ., June 4, 2008, no.
06/02604 (Fr.); Cour d’appel [CA] [Regional Court of Appeal] Reims, ch. civ., July 20, 2010, no. 08/01519
(Fr.).
181
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The legislative changes did not have any direct effect; rather, they needed
members to transpose the changes into their respective national law by the
legislature of each individual E.U. member state.187 Therefore, trademark law in
E.U. member states is not identical, but based on a uniform minimum standard
as set down by the 2015 legislation.188 Nevertheless, the E.C.J. decisions in
Leur-Bloem v. Inspecteur and Giloy v. Hauptzollamt held that national
trademark laws must be interpreted in accordance with the Trade Marks
Directive and the economic and political goals it sets forth.189 A mark’s
registration is valid under E.U. law if it can enable consumers to distinguish
branded goods from others of different origin, in other words distinctiveness,
and is nonfunctional.190 These criteria support the general policies that undergird
trademarks.
2. United States Trademark Law
Unlike U.S. patent and copyright law, trademark law does not have a specific
constitutional basis for protection in the United States.191 The Constitution
grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”192 In the seminal Trade-Mark
Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court held that trademarks do not fall under this
clause’s umbrella.193 Instead, trademarks derive their status as protectable
intellectual property from common law and the Lanham Act.194 The Supreme
Court explicitly distinguished trademarks from patents and copyrights
explaining that trademarks have no necessary relation to invention or discovery
and instead a trademark generally adopts “something already in existence as the
distinctive symbol of the party using it.”195 Since then, trademarks held a
different status than other intellectual property by becoming useful and valuable
aids or instruments of commerce.196
187

See TFEU, supra note 185.
See Verena von Bomhard & Artur Geier, Unregistered Trademarks in EU Trademark Law, 107
TRADEMARK REP. 677, 679–80 (2017). See generally Annette Kur, The EU Trademark Reform Package–(Too)
Bold a Step Ahead or Back to Status Quo, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 15 (2015) (detailing the 2015
trademark legislation).
189
Case C-28/95, A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2, 1997
E.C.R. I-4161; 96 Case C-130/95, Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost, 1997 E.C.R. I-4291.
190
See EUTMR, supra note 184; TMD, supra note 184.
191
See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879).
192
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
193
See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93–94.
194
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2013).
195
In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
196
Id. at 95.
188
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U.S. trademark law is vast with a robust doctrine of both judicial and
administrative decisions. However, distinctiveness and functionality are two
grounds which a U.S. court or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
may decide to cancel FKC’s Kahlo’s marks. Indeed, a trademark may be
cancelled if it becomes the generic name for less than all of the goods or services,
or a portion thereof, for which it is registered.197 What this means in practice is
that whether a trademark is generic is determined by a spectrum of
distinctiveness based on the relationship between the mark and the goods or
services in connection with which the mark used.198 As a result, a trademark is
considered generic if it describes a quality or characteristic of the good or service
or it is the common name of the good or service.
Furthermore, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) provides that a trademark may be
cancelled at any time if it is functional.199 The specifics of what makes a
trademark functional varies. Courts recognize two types of functionality as
grounds for denying trade dress protection to product design features: traditional
or utilitarian functionality, and aesthetic functionality.200 First, a product feature
is considered to be “functional” in a utilitarian sense if it is either essential to the
use or purpose of the article, or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.201
Conversely, when the aesthetic design of a product is itself the mark for which
protection is sought, courts will deem the mark aesthetically functional, and
therefore ineligible for protection under the Lanham Act—if protection of the
mark significantly undermines competitors’ ability to compete in the relevant
market.202
3. Mexican Trademark Law
After years of using the TRIPS agreements’ trademark definition, currently,
Mexican industrial property law defines a trademark as any sign that is
perceptible to the senses and which can be displayed in a manner that clearly
and precisely allows the protected subject matter to be identified and
distinguishes products or services from others of the same type or category in

197

15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
See generally Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976)
(describing the famous spectrum of marks as arbitrary/fanciful, suggestive, descriptive with secondary meaning,
descriptive, and generic).
199
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (explaining that aspects of a product
that are functional generally cannot serve as a trademark).
200
Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent America, 696 F.3d 206, 219 (2012).
201
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982).
202
Christian Louboutin, 696 F.3d, at 219–20, 222.
198
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the market.203 Considering Mexico’s largest trade partner is the United States,
Mexico has harmonized its laws to parallel its next-door neighbor. Unlike the
United States, however, where different legal doctrines developed to address
different forms of intellectual property, Mexican industrial property law governs
all intellectual property, including trademarks.204 Accordingly, the development
of Mexican trademark law directly derives from Mexico’s patent law.205
The first law to govern intellectual property in Mexico was a decree issued
by the Spanish Courts on October 2, 1820, to ensure the right of ownership to
parties who invent, perfect, or introduce any branch of industry.206 In 1991
Mexico enacted the Mexican industrial property law that still governs today
increasing the duration to ten years.207 Since then, Mexican trademark law has
seen major developments, first driven by the enactment of the North American
Free Trade Agreement in 1994 and then the pressure to harmonize its laws with
its major trade partners, namely the United States.208 The most notable
development was the establishment of Mexico’s first formal trademark
opposition system in 2015.209
Under Mexican industrial property law, determination regarding a mark’s
functionality and distinctiveness are among the grounds to refuse a mark’s
registration or subsequently cancel a mark.210 Accordingly, an examiner will
reject a mark if it is the technical or commonly used name of a product or
services or if the word has turned into the usual or generic designation of said
products or services in everyday language or business practice.211 Likewise,
descriptive or indicative words that serve to identify the kind, quality, quantity,
composition, purpose, value, or place of origin of the products or the time of
their production are also unregistrable.212
The concepts of distinctiveness and functionality in the European Union,
United States, and Mexico exemplify the harmonization of international
trademark law through the general acceptance of underlying policies behind
trademarks. Based on the U.S. lawsuits, the potential arguments regarding the
203

Mexican Industrial Property Law, supra note 73, art. 88.
See generally id.
205
See generally id.
206
MARÍA NARVÁEZ TIJERINA, EL SISTEMA MEXICANO DE PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL 21 (2010).
207
Mexican Industrial Property Law, supra note 73, art. 95.
208
TIJERINA, supra note 207, at 35; John M. Murphy, The New Trademark Opposition System in Mexico,
107 TRADEMARK REP. 746, 749 (2017).
209
See generally Murphy, supra note 209, at 747.
210
See Mexican Industrial Property Law, supra note 73, art. 90.
211
Id.
212
Mexican Industrial Property Law, supra note 73, art. 90.
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functionality and distinctiveness of Kahlo’s trademarks are obvious. Challengers
will argue that the Kahlo trademarks are functional and generic in seeking their
cancellation.213 Conversely, FKC will argue that the Kahlo trademarks are
nonfunctional and distinctive.214 The brief survey of the trademark jurisdictions
above is to emphasize that the trademark framework that disadvantages
marginalized populations is not unique to the United States. While U.S. courts
have not decided one way or another, the focus of inquiry for this Comment is
not whether subsequent litigation in other jurisdictions could result in the
cancellation of Kahlo’s trademark. Instead, this analysis proceeds by utilizing
CRT to challenge the normative and dominant understanding of the function of
law governing Kahlo’s trademarks.
III. FREEING KAHLO: APPLYING CRITICAL RACE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO
KAHLO’S TRADEMARKS
Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming ownership of that freed self was
another.
—Toni Morrison215
Before evaluating the racial landscape of trademark law around the world, it
is important to first position trademark law historically and to supply a
framework of its critique. Section A explores the blatant racism trademark law
permitted and exacerbated globally. Section B then provides the central tenets
and queries of a CRT and Critical Race IP analysis, while Section C explains the
practical function of said analysis. Finally, Section D offers a Critical Race IP
analysis of Kahlo’s trademarks to examine aspects of local and international
trademark law.
A. The Racist History of Trademarks around the World
Trademark law has essentially legalized and promulgated the use of racist
representations of Black people and other marginalized racial and ethnic
minorities.216 Consequently, trademarks have a long history of stigmatizing
people of color, especially Black people, and reinforcing racists tropes around
the globe due to globalization.217 For example, in the United States, notable
213

The artists made this argument. See Shope’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 12–13.
FKC made this argument. See FKC’s Complaint, supra note 72.
215
TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 111–12 (1987).
216
See K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues,
16 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 365, 375 (2008) [hereinafter Greene, Lady Sings the Blues].
217
Id.
214
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racist trademarks include Uncle Ben, Aunt Jemima, and countless indigenous
symbols.218 In fact, U.S. trademarks are notably full of “slave-rooted” images of
Black people.219 But the United States is not alone—trademarks are racist
everywhere. Sarotti, a German chocolate brand, used variations of tray-carrying
Black people until 2004.220 Similarly, Mexican food conglomerate Grupo Bimbo
spent decades using racist caricatures of Black people as the trademark of its
chocolate pastry, Negrito.221 Grupo Bimbo eventually replaced the Black
caricature on its products with a new trademark depicting a racially ambiguous
boy with a massive afro haircut.222 Negrito commercials showed a boy eating
the pastry as it transformed his hair into a large afro.223 While Grupo Bimbo
finally renamed the pastry Nito in 2013, it kept the afro haircut trademark.224
Similarly, Banania, a popular breakfast brand in France, still uses a smiling
Senegalese man wearing a fez as its trademark.225 While the trademark moved
away from its 1915 drawing of a realistic person, now depicting a colorful
cartoon, it unmistakably remains a caricature of a Black man.226 As globalization
increases, the impact of these trademarks are not bound by a country’s borders.
Marketing and advertising severely affect consumers by making trademarks
a predominant source of information in the market which ultimately pours over
to inform consumers’ general perceptions and understandings of the world.227
For example, Grupo Bimbo sold Negritos and its racist trademark in
supermarkets across North and South America.228 Anti-Black racism existed in
North American and South American countries long before Negritos decked
supermarket shelves.229 While Banania may not share the same popularity in
218
See MALTE HINRICHSEN, RACIST TRADEMARKS 82 (2012); see also Lady Sings the Blues, supra note
217, at 375.
219
Greene, Lady Sings the Blues, supra note 216, at 376.
220
HINRICHSEN, supra note 218, at 83.
221
SirNoodlehe, Up Until 2013, Negrito Was a Popular Snack in Mexico, REDDIT: ACCIDENTAL RACISM
(2018), https://www.reddit.com/r/AccidentalRacism/comments/690llt/up_until_2013_negrito_was_a_popular_
snack_in.
222
See Snack I Saw in Mexico a While Ago. Negrito by Bimbo!, IMGUR (May 22, 2015), https://imgur.com/
NaYDkn7.
223
Id.; see also BIMBO Nito ‘Trasforma cualquier momento’ (2018), YOUTUBE (Sept. 8, 2018)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ji4U9LvZHgk; BIMBO NEGRITO.mp4, YOUTUBE (June 23, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ukeXj062xc.
224
SirNoodlehe, supra note 221; see BIMBO Nito ‘Trasforma cualquier momento’, supra note 223;
BIMBO NEGRITO.mp4, supra note 223.
225
HINRICHSEN, supra note 218, at 83–85.
226
Id.
227
Greene, Lady Sings the Blues, supra note 216, at 374–75.
228
GRUPO BIMBO: OUR HISTORY, https://www.grupobimbo.com/en/ourhistory.
229
See generally, e.g., Tanya K. Hernandez, Colorism and the Law in Latin America - Global Perspectives
on Colorism Conference Remarks, 14 WASH. UNIV. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 683 (2015) (describing the racism in
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major supermarkets outside of France, it remains an Amazon order away from
any consumer with internet access.230 As such, trademarks with caricatures of
Black people dehumanize Black bodies and do little to expand perceptions of
Black people in localities with limited representations of Black people.231 As a
result, trademark laws do more than protect consumers and producers—they
directly impact that enters the public’s consciousness.
Despite its underlying purpose to help and protect consumers, trademark law
around the world resembles tenets of property law more than intellectual
property because of the ability to maintain a trademark permanently.232 As such,
FKC’s ownership and use of Kahlo trademarks jeopardizes her legacy, life, and
work as another marketable caricature. Owing to its expressive and economic
dimension, the Kahlo trademark embodies trademarks’ ability to inhabit a
multiplicity of meanings. As a result, Kahlo’s trademark operates a device of
owned property, expression, and culture.233 The tension between these facets
produces a nearly irreconcilable incompatibility between the marketplaces of
goods and of ideas. Taking a look at the Aunt Jemima trademark offers insight
into the implications of local and international trademark law.
The invention of the “Aunt Jemima” trademark cemented a growing trend in
advertising to trademark depictions of racial and ethnic minorities to sell goods
and services.234 Trademarks based on Black people perceived racial minorities
not as consumers or citizens to be marketed to, but as a set of images and tools
in a company’s brand.235 As a result, trademark law around the world
transformed people of color from a racial subject, a person, to a racial object, a
trademark—a piece of intellectual property.236 Like Aunt Jemima, trademark
law is dominated by a profound conflict between economic value and social
meaning.237 The AUNT JEMIMA trademark highlights how trademarks are
Latin America).
230
See Banania Chocolate Powder from France 400 grams, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/BananiaChocolate-Breakfast-France-14-1oz/dp/B0041Y4XE0 (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
231
See Greene, Lady Sings the Blues, supra note 216, at 376–77.
232
Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1612 (2010). See generally,
e.g., Lemley, supra note 159, at 1688 (explaining that courts protect marks “as things valuable in and of
themselves, rather than for the product goodwill they embody”); Lunney, Jr., supra note 159, at 371 (“[T]he
expansion [of trademark law since the mid-1950s] has focused on a trademark’s value not merely as a device
for conveying otherwise indiscernible information concerning a product (‘deception-based trademark’), but as a
valuable product in itself (‘property-based trademark’).”).
233
See Katyal, supra note 232, at 1606.
234
Id. at 1610.
235
Id. at 1610–11.
236
See id.
237
Id. at 1611.
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commodities in one sense and expressions in another to both the mark holder
that owns them and to the public that perceives them.238 As such, the law inherits
the responsibility of navigating a trademark’s potential contradiction between
its status as corporate property and as cultural icon.239 Because trademark law
focuses only on how marks communicate information about a certain product or
corporation within the marketplace of goods, it largely underestimates the more
complex role that trademarks play within society.240 Assuming trademark law is
colorblind only exacerbates the problem further.
Colorblind optics suggests that the long history of racist trademarks has more
to do with the zeitgeist and little to do with trademark law. After all, unlike other
areas of law that blatantly disadvantage marginalized communities, trademark
law does not come to mind as an area of law ripe for reform. However, applying
CRT, and Critical Race IP more specifically, to trademark law reveals something
different: trademark systems around the world cultivate inequity. Kahlo, an anticapitalist, queer, Mexican woman, is trademark law’s next casualty.
B. An Overview of CRT and an Introduction to Critical Race Intellectual
Property
Developed in the 1980s and heavily influenced by Black women, CRT has
primarily dedicated itself to anti-racist and anti-sexist struggles.241 CRT was the
result of scholars of color who wanted to critique and to explore the relationships
between law, race, racism, and social power in ways that existing fields, such as
Critical Legal Studies or the liberal civil rights tradition, could not or had not.242
Since then, CRT scholars continuously expound core tenets of CRT: that race is
a social construction and a performative identity; that racism is endemic and
institutionalized in society; that social and historical context is very important in
any particular analysis of racial issues, and; to develop potential solutions to the
societal problems it creates.243 Of course, any one-sentence description of the
origins of a movement as complex and as diverse as CRT is necessarily
incomplete.244
238

Id. at 1612.
Id.
240
Id.
241
See CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 22, at xi, xiii, xvi; see also DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (2003) (examining first-year case law through CRT).
242
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 22, at xi, xiii.
243
See Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593, 1607–15 (2011) (giving an
overview of these ideas and how they play an important role in defining the “whatness” of CRT scholarship).
244
See, e.g., Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move
Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253 (2011).
239
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Consequently, there is no single answer for what CRT is. In fact, most CRT
scholars eschew the notion of a fully unified school of thought.245 In doing so,
general tenets of CRT are built on addressing how race is socially constructed
and how law itself constructs race and produces racial meaning.246 CRT
challenges the substance of legal scholarship by recognizing that racism is
engrained in the fabric and system of existing power structures.247 CRT is
committed to confronting “the historical centrality and complicity of law in
upholding white supremacy (and concomitant hierarchies of gender, class, and
sexual orientation)” and transforming the relationship between law and white
supremacy to reshape U.S. jurisprudence in a project of racial emancipation and
anti-subordination.248 In doing so, CRT demonstrates a commitment to radical
critique of the law and radical emancipation by the law.249 Aiming to develop a
jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in the law, CRT works toward
the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminating all forms of
subordination.250
To think about how law itself constructs race, CRT acknowledges the way
legal systems, despite their ideal notional neutrality, are structurally designed to
keep insiders in power—a design that typically works to disadvantage outsiders
such as people of color, women, sexual minorities, and the poor.251 What this
means is that even “color-blind” laws often serve to further insider privileges
along the lines of race, gender, and class while marginalizing and obscuring
social, political, and economic inequality.252 CRT insists on “the need to account
for multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is
constructed”—especially when law is involved.253 Accordingly, because racial
245
See CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 22, at xiii (“[T]here is no canonical set of doctrines or
methodologies to which [CRT scholars] all subscribe.”).
246
See Calmore, supra note 25, at 2160 (“[CRT] begins with a recognition that ‘race’ is not a fixed term.
Instead, ‘race’ is a fluctuating, decentered complex of social meanings that are formed and transformed under
the constant pressures of political struggle.”).
247
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 22, at 314.
248
Id. at xi, xiii (observing that the goal of CRT is “not merely to understand the vexed bond between law
and racial power but to change it[]”).
249
Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 893, 899.
250
Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and Jurisprudence for the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 n.7 (1991).
251
See Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054, 1069, 1105 (1978) (demonstrating how the
Court’s privileging of the perpetrator perspective at the expense of the victim perspective entrenches inequality);
see also Mario L. Barnes, “The More Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
in a “Post-Race” World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043, 2067 (2016) (extending Freeman’s analysis to argue that the
Court is now in an “Era of Incredulity” when it comes to claims from outsiders challenging insiders).
252
See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 22.
253
Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
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privilege and racial subordination are often elided in the law, much of CRT
involves making race visible with an analysis that is critical and particularly
attuned to the frequencies and registers of race.254
Beyond these broad concerns, a review of the CRT’s key writings reveals
several recurring themes. First, CRT is committed to the development of
counter-accounts of social reality by subversive and subaltern elements of the
reigning order.255 To this end, CRT contests the very language of traditional
legal and social analysis by rejecting the preference for neutral, disengaged,
unraced, and unsexed voices in legal scholarship.256 Instead, CRT supports the
incorporation of personal narrative, or what is often referred to as legal
storytelling, to critique and assess law’s master narratives.257 This embrace of
outsider voices and narrative is so fundamental that CRT has been called “voice
scholarship.”258 Second, CRT maintains that true change is possible only
through radical interventions.259 This perspective also considers a popular idea
that legal reforms that ostensibly benefit minorities only occur when the reforms
also advance the interests of the white majority.260
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245 (1991); see also Regina Austin, “The Black Community,”
Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1817 (1992) (emphasizing differences
in racial identity along gender, class, and geographic lines); Darren L. Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial
Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 640–41 (1997)
(offering multidimensionality to describe the very inseparability of identity categories); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1419 (1991) (arguing that punishing drug addicts who choose to carry their pregnancies to term violates
their constitutional rights considering that Black women experience several forms of oppression
simultaneously).
254
See I. Bennett Capers, Reading Back, Reading Black, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 12 (2006).
255
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 22, at xiii.
256
Id. (noting that CRT “rejects the prevailing orthodoxy that scholarship should be or could be ‘neutral’
and ‘objective[]’”).
257
For examples of legal scholarship doing this work, see, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); Margaret E. Montoya, Máscaras, Trenzas, y Greñas: Un/Masking the Self
While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 185 (1994); Russell K.
Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (2008); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun,
Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625; Williams,
supra note 26.
258
Monica Bell, The Obligation Thesis: Understanding the Persistent “Black Voice” in Modern Legal
Scholarship, 68 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 643, 646 (2007) (citation omitted).
259
Crenshaw et al., CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 22.
260
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (explaining that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites[]” by analyzing Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), to demonstrate that civil rights advances for blacks only occurred because they coincided
with the self-interest of white elites, who were concerned with promoting a humanitarian image of the U.S. visa-vis their foreign relations with the Soviet Union). But see Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence
Thesis, 105 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 149 (2011) (offering many theoretical criticisms of the interest-convergence
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Building on the tenets of CRT, in Critical Race IP, Anjali Vats and Deidre
A. Keller expound the themes, hopes, and endeavors of a theoretical framework
for an interdisciplinary movement they dub “Critical Race Intellectual Property”
(Critical Race IP).261 Vats and Keller emphasize the urgency to examine racial
investments and implications of intellectual property to, among other things,
untangle the cultural implications of intellectual properties and intellectual
property law.262 Critical Race IP offers an area of study describing the
scholarship concerned with the intersections of race and intellectual property
law—a fitting home for Kahlo’s trademarks.263 With this understanding in hand,
examining the varying trademark doctrines becomes more than a scholarly
exercise, but rather a direct call to challenge and question legal structures. In the
case of Kahlo, Critical Race IP and comparative law work together to critique
local and international trademark jurisprudence.
C. The Function of a Critical Race Intellectual Property Analysis
The function of a Critical Race IP analysis of trademark law is twofold. First,
application of CRT to issues in trademark law sheds light on overlooked racial
inequalities and subordination not only of trademark law, but also of the
trademark registration process. Second, a trademark analysis of racial
inequalities reveals racial disparities in parties’ relative ability to challenge or
protect trademarks. Thus, a Critical Race IP analysis does not stop with the
application of CRT principles to varying doctrines of trademark law and the
registration process. Rather, a Critical Race IP analysis also applies a trademark
analysis to the racial justice problem itself. In doing so, it explores how
conventional treatments of trademark issues pose both racial justice and
trademark concerns. This often exposes trademark law that supports white
privilege and dominance or reflects that white norms are treated more favorably
than those which reflect minority perspectives. Lawmakers did not craft
trademark laws with a racially discriminatory purpose or inherently
discriminatory, but their unequal or incomplete application produces a racially
subordinating effect.
To make this framework more concrete, a Critical Race IP example might
be helpful. One example is the way copyright law disadvantaged black cultural
production—namely jazz.264 A Critical Race IP analysis can highlight how
thesis).
261
262
263
264

Vats & Keller, supra note 21, at 736.
See id. at 737–43.
See generally id.
See K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS
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copyright law developed within social structures that historically did not serve
the interests of black cultural production. The structure of copyright law, built
and applied upon broad and pervasive social discrimination, resulted in the
widespread denial of copyright protection to Black music artists.265 One of the
copyright structures that disadvantaged Black cultural production is the ideaexpression dichotomy. The idea-expression dichotomy is a fundamental tenet of
copyright law mandating that copyright law should not protect raw ideas but
only the expression of ideas.266 Part of the justification for the dichotomy is that
if the first person to articulate a theory, divulge a principle, or lay out a plot line
could prevent all others from using it for several decades, progress in creative
works would be stymied rather than promoted.267 A second structure is that
copyright law requires authors to fix musical works in a tangible form, such as
sheet music or a recording, for copyright protection as musical composition.268
The rationale for this requirement arose from interpretation that the U.S.
Constitution authorizes Congress to protect “Writings” and writing in a fixed
form.269
These de jure race-neutral aspects of copyright law promote economic
theory or uphold the Constitution, respectively, but a Critical Race IP
examination reveals that in practice the idea-expression dichotomy of copyright
and the tangible requirement disparately impacted Black innovators. For
example, Black composers’ ground-breaking work in jazz and blues was
imitated and appropriated widely.270 Tracing its development as far back as
slavery, Black cultural production reproduced itself out of an oral predicate and
non-Western norms.271 This tradition is fundamental in jazz. Copyright law’s
tangible requirement left many Black jazz artists who could not functionally read
or write unable to create tangible compositions of their creations because they
faced educational deprivation and the inherent difficulty of jazz rhythm using
Western musical notation.272 Like its application to copyright law, a Critical
Race IP analysis of trademark law attempts to expose the unbalanced playing
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 356 (1999) [hereinafter Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music].
265
Id. at 368.
266
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
267
K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over African-American
Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1200 (2008) [hereinafter Greene, Copynorms].
268
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2007).
269
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
270
See generally Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 264, at 368.
271
Greene, Copynorms, supra note 267, at 1201. See generally PETER TOWNSEND, JAZZ IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 21 (2000) (remarking that the “earliest Europeans attempting to write down African-American music
found it formidably difficult”).
272
Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 264, at 378.
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field of challenging and protecting trademarks—an aspect exacerbated on the
international stage. Recognizing that the deck is stacked against marginalized
populations, namely people of color, in a multitude of inconspicuous ways, is a
necessary first step to prompt mitigation of implicit and structural racial bias
surrounding trademark registration and subsequent challenges and protections
for trademarks.
D. A Critical Race Intellectual Property Analysis of Kahlo’s Trademarks
This Section turns to a Critical Race IP analysis of Kahlo’s trademarks to
examine aspects of trademark law in the United States and the European Union.
There are two key purposes of a Critical Race IP analysis and a comparative law
approach. First, application of Critical Race IP to local and international
problems uncovers overlooked racial inequalities under general trademark
law.273 Second, comparative law adjusts the perspective by which one perceives
the law, due to its ability to challenge entrenched categorizations and
fundamental assumptions in one’s own and others’ legal cultures.274 Kahlo’s
trademark registration highlights the unbalanced power dynamics involved in
the registration process. Regardless of jurisdiction, the processes to register
trademarks are riddled with components of how trademark law serves to protect
and preserve existing power structures that ensure “insiders” remain in power
and benefit from the subordination of “outsiders.” Accordingly, this Section will
focus on one aspect and look at the power dynamics involved in deciding
whether to refuse a trademark registration because the mark is descriptive and
therefore generic.275 In applying CRT to local and international trademark law,

273
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law’s Potential for Broadening Legal
Perspectives, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 658 (1998).
274
Id.
275
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1); Regulation 2017/1001, art. 7(1), 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1 (EU). In the United
States and European Union, an applicant can overcome this rejection by proving the mark acquired
distinctiveness through use. Regulation 2017/1001, art. 111(2)(k), 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1 (EU); Ralston Purina Co.
v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 133, 173 USPQ 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Proving acquired
distinctiveness in the European Union is unclear. Some courts merely require a showing that consumers
recognize the product. See, e.g., Mondelez UK Holdings & Services Ltd. v. Société des Produits Nestlé S.A.,
EUIPO, Joined Cases C-84/17 P, C-85-17 P, & C-95-17 P, EU:C:2018:266 (Apr. 19, 2018) (finding that
consumer recognition of the mark is enough); EUIPO, Case T-112/13, EU:T:2016:735, paras. 95–107 (GC, Dec.
15, 2016) (finding that consumer recognition of the mark is enough). Others require more than consumer
recognition or association for the mark to become legally distinctive. See Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. v.
Cadbury UK Ltd., [2017] EWCA (Civ) 358, paras. 76–84 (May 17, 2017) (finding that mere recognition or
association falls short of the standard). In the United States, to show a mark acquired distinctiveness, also known
as “secondary meaning,” an applicant must prove that the mark has become distinctive as applied to the
applicant’s goods or services in commerce. Ralston Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 133
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).

ALBARRÁN_4.28.21

660

5/10/2021 2:15 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

this Section is guided by a primary inquiry: how does the legal doctrine, practice,
and custom of trademark law subordinate interests of marginalized
communities? Accordingly, this Section scrutinizes what appears neutral on its
face or in its application.
It is crucial to understand the power of the trademark gatekeepers: the
attorney examiners that analyze applications for trademarks. In the USPTO,
officials who examine trademark applications are attorneys, while in the
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) officials with degrees or
post-graduate degrees in law are preferred, but it is not a requirement per se.
Examiners for the USPTO and the EUIPO hold great power and discretion in
determining whether a mark is merely descriptive of goods or services.276
Generally, a mark is considered merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient,
quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of the specified goods
or services.277 While this is only one example of the power of USPTO and
EUIPO examiners to gatekeep, it emphasizes the limitations of assumed
neutrality in the trademark registration process. If the examining attorney deems
the mark merely descriptive, then the mark is not registrable, unless the applicant
shows that consumers associate the mark with a secondary meaning—as an
indication of source—rather than just the term’s primary, descriptive
meaning.278 The following cases highlight how the examiner’s power comes into
play.
Useful examples of how the examiner’s power comes into play in refusing
registration of a mark because it is merely descriptive are the cases of marks
“MARTHA WASHINGTON” and “LITTLE MERMAID” for use in dolls.
Martha Washington was the wife of George Washington and is considered the
most famous U.S. Revolutionary War woman.279 After appealing the refusal of
MARTHA WASHINGTON as a trademark for dolls, the TTAB upheld the
examiner’s decision that a MARTHA WASHINGTON mark covering dolls was
merely descriptive of a doll intended to represent the historical figure Martha
Washington.280 The TTAB reasoned that consumers would not necessarily link
Martha Washington’s name or image to a particular commercial entity and

276

See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1).
See In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
278
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); Ralston Purina, 341 F. Supp. at 133; In re Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
279
AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR FACTS: MARTHA WASHINGTON FACTS, https://www.americanrevolutionary-war-facts.com/American-Revolutionary-War-Women-Facts/Martha-Washington-Facts.html.
280
In re Carlson Dolls Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1319, 1320 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
277
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instead link the doll to the fictional historical figure.281 Because prospective
consumers expect dolls that depict characters to have labels of the character’s
name, the same reasoning applies to fictional public-domain characters, like the
Little Mermaid.282 As such, a LITTLE MERMAID mark for dolls is merely
descriptive because it refers to the fictional public domain character and does
not serve as a source identifier. This allows toy makers interested in marketing
a Little Mermaid doll to use “Little Mermaid” to describe that the doll depicts
the Little Mermaid.283 The determination of whether a mark comprising the
name of a historical figure or a fictional character serves as a source identifier
or is merely descriptive turns on whether the USPTO or EUIPO examining
attorney believes consumers link the mark to a particular commercial entity or
whether others have a competitive need to use the name to describe their
products.284
The registration of the FRIDA KAHLO mark for Class 28 goods and
services shows the potential unintended outcomes of tasking USPTO or EUIPO
examining attorneys with determining the links consumers make. Before closing
her case, Shope pointed to the refusals for the MARTHA WASHINGTON mark
for Class 28 goods to argue the examining attorney erroneously issued the
mark.285 One theory as to why the examiner did not find the mark, FRIDA
KAHLO, as merely descriptive of the person, Frida Kahlo, was because the
examiner did not know who Kahlo was, or failed to recognize her.286
Unsurprisingly, among the relief Shope sought was the cancellation of FKC’s
U.S. trademark registration over the use of the mark “FRIDA KAHLO” for Class
28 goods because it is generic, purely functional, and merely descriptive.287
Not knowing, or failing to recognize, Kahlo is a plausible theory explaining
the mark’s registration in Class 28 goods. Despite the rise of Fridamania
elevating Kahlo’s popularity into new heights through the 1980s and 1990s or
the Hollywood major motion picture in 2002, it is still possible that an examiner
did not know or recognize Kahlo in 2005 when Isolda and Mara filed the specific
trademark application.288 Women of color continually experience indifference
281

Id.
In re United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 122 U.S.P.Q.2d 1796, 1798–99 (T.T.A.B. 2017).
283
See id.
284
See In re United Trademark Holdings, 122 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1799–1800; In re Carlson Dolls, 31
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1319–20.
285
Shope’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 10.
286
Amanda Pampuro, Denver Doll Maker to Corporation: You Don’t Own Frida Kahlo, WESTWORD
(June 12, 2019), https://www.westword.com/content/printView/11374186.
287
Shope’s Complaint, supra note 17, at 12–13.
288
See supra Part II.B.
282
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from legal systems and society and the possibility that an USPTO examiner’s
failed to recognize Kahlo’s name offers another example of the problem.289
While the theory is not farfetched, it is crucial to look at other aspects of the
trademark registration process and not focus solely on one examiner’s decision.
To reject an application on genericness grounds, a USPTO examiner must
meet the heightened burden of showing clear and convincing evidence that the
applied-for designation is generic.290 Conversely, in both federal court and
TTAB proceedings a challenger must prove the mark is generic by a
preponderance of the evidence.291 Precedence might suggest that a “Frida
Kahlo” mark for dolls is nothing more than descriptive of dolls that depict Kahlo,
and therefore generic, but that may nonetheless fall short of for an examiner.
Consequently, the evidentiary burden pigeonholes examiners to avoid
determining genericness, even in situations like Kahlo’s. And that might be the
point of the process. The heightened threshold allows examiners to make
cautionary decisions and removes a highly factual and often complicated
question from the examiner’s judgment. This highlights the problem of a legal
process designed to streamline the entrance of goods into the market. The
trademark registration system will invariably facilitate processes that prioritize
and promote consumption while other considerations—like the racial
implications of a trademark—are placed on the back burner.
Unlike the USPTO, the EUIPO does not give its examiners an evidentiary
burden to meet to reject a mark due to descriptiveness.292 Examiners, however,
do rely on extensively detailed EUIPO guidelines for their examinations of
marks.293 The guideline that includes the most recent EU trademark reforms is
1,610 pages long and details numerous EU cases and hypothetical examples to
help examiners make decisions including, but not limited to, grounds to refuse a
mark for descriptiveness.294 Notably, the guidelines go on to explain how the
examiners’ use of the “reference base,” or the ordinary understanding of the
relevant public of the word in question, can be corroborated by dictionary
entries, examples of the use of the term in a descriptive manner found on internet
289
See generally, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 253, (arguing the need to account for multiple grounds of
identity when considering how the social world is constructed); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives
on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 371–71 (1991) (analyzing a case of employment
termination due to someone’s hair, exemplifying intersectional race and gender discrimination).
290
See TMEP § 1209.01(c)(i); In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 600–01 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
291
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a); see also Colt Defense LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 705–06
(1st Cir. 2007).
292
EUIPO, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION 428 (2021).
293
See generally id.
294
Id.
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websites, or it may clearly follow from the ordinary understanding of the term.295
Like the USPTO, however, the EUIPO’s approach ultimately leads to powerful
gatekeepers in control. The heightened burden of the USPTO and the wide
discretion for the EUIPO seem to highlight opposite approaches but may
ultimately serve the same purpose of prioritizing the market of goods over other
considerations.
An example of the EUIPO’s guidelines in action is a 2015 decision regarding
a JANIS JOPLIN trademark application for Class 9 goods and services.296 The
EUIPO examiner reasoned that the mark is descriptive and devoid of distinctive
character, arguing that Janis Joplin is known as a U.S. rock and blues singer of
the sixties.297 According to the examiner, the relevant consumer would
immediately relate the goods and services applied for as somehow related to the
famous singer.298 For example, CDs featuring music in Class 9 may feature
songs or covers of songs sung or written by Janis Joplin. Electronic game
software may feature Janis Joplin as the main character of the game.299 As such,
to the examiner, the mark conveyed clear information regarding the subject
matter of the goods and services in question and rejected the application.300
The applicant appealed and requested the Boards of Appeal of the Office for
Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM Board) to annul the contested
decision and allow the application for registration by arguing that the mark
JANIS JOPLIN had no descriptive meaning in respect of the goods and services
subject to the application nor lacked distinctive character.301 According to the
applicant, consumers would not consider the mark JANIS JOPLIN as an
indication of the content or subject matter of the goods and services because the
mark did not designate a quality or any characteristic of the goods and
services.302 Rather the JANIS JOPLIN mark indicated the commercial origin of
the goods and services considering the applicant, much like FKC, was a
company who owned the rights to Janis Joplin.303 For support, the applicant
referred to previous registrations of the names of famous singers and bands.304

295

Id. at 428.
See In Case R 2292/2014-4 DECISION of the Fourth Board of Appeal of 24 March 2015.
297
Id. at 2.
298
Id.
299
Id.
300
Id.
301
Id. at 3–4.
302
Id.
303
Id.; JANIS JOPLIN, https://janisjoplin.com (“JANIS® and JANIS JOPLIN® are registered trademarks
of Fantality Corp”).
304
These examples included famous names such as RIHANNA, JUSTIN BIEBER, BEYONCÉ, THE
296
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Contrary to what the examiner found, the OHIM Board elaborated how the
JANIS JOPLIN mark fulfilled a trademark’s function as an indicator of origin.305
As such, the OHIM Board explained that the fact that JANIS JOPLIN may
constitute the name of a famous singer did not exclude it as an origin-indicating
mark.306 According to the OHIM Board, the mark JANIS JOPLIN was not
capable of describing a particular category of CDs or DVDs that could be the
subject-matter of these goods and services, like rock or blues.307 Therefore, it
was unlikely that the relevant customers would perceive the mark as an
indication of the subject matter of the goods and services for which registration
was sought.308 The OHIM Board explained that the relevant public would not
perceive the mark as descriptive in relation to the goods and services appliedfor.309 In the OHIM Board’s opinion, there were no indications that the public
would not perceive the JANIS JOPLIN mark as a commercial indication of
origin and annulled the examiner’s rejection.310
Notably absent in the OHIM Board’s decision is any reference to how it
reached its consumer behavior conclusions or what the OHIM Board utilized to
reach its conclusion. Therein lies the problem, one that is not novel to any
country in the world—the United States included. Judges, examiners, USPTO
and EUIPO Boards, all presume an understanding of the average, or reasonable,
person. What it means to be a reasonable consumer, or a reasonable person, is
framed and constructed without full understanding of many marginalized
populations.311 This case exemplifies the power in the process placed on EUIPO
examiners. How decisionmakers’ personal knowledge impacts the process
speaks volumes to the power of decisionmakers in determining what is and is
not famous, or well-known, and how consumers behave. In this case, neither the
examiner, the applicant, nor the OHIM Board required a certain standard and
DOORS, AEROSMITH, LADY GAGA, ONE DIRECTION, or BEATLES. See In Case R 2292/2014-4 at 3.
305
Id. at 4.
306
Id.
307
Id. at 4–5.
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
The liberal legal subject, “is a highly accountable, independent, and socially de-contextualised agent
that also seems to stay clear of any major influences relations to attributes.” Taina Cooke, Seeing Past The
Liberal Legal Subject: Cultural Defence, Agengy And Women, 42 SUOMEN ANTROPOLOGI 23, 23 (2017). For
scholarship critiquing the liberal legal subject, see, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in
Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 781, 782 (2008); Graham Cronogue, Race and the Fourth Amendment:
Why the Reasonable Person Analysis Should Include Race as a Factor, 20 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 55 (2014). See
generally Laura Cohen, “The Reasonable Black Child”—Youth, Race, and the Fourth Amendment, 33 CRIM.
JUST. 37 (2018); Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1455 (2010); Lydia J. Carlsgaard, Reasonable Person and I, 27 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 165 (2016).
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solely relied on their experience and personal knowledge. Without a clearer
framework that identifies how race and ethnicity cannot be divorced from
consumers, trademark law will continue to jeopardize marginalized applicants
that are impacted by these decisions.
In the United States, challengers of registered trademarks must prove the
mark is generic by a preponderance of the evidence.312 When analyzing whether
a designation is generic, courts consider the relevant good or service; the
relevant consuming public; and the primary significance of the designation to
these consumers. Generally, genericness determinations are based on the
perception of the actual and potential purchasers of the goods or services in
issue.313 In cases involving ordinary consumer goods, the relevant consumer
group is the general public while the relevant consumer group may differ when
the goods or services are marketed to non-consumers.314 Nonetheless, the court
determines how the majority of the relevant consuming public views the alleged
mark.315 Because a mark may have significance both as a trademark and as a
generic term, the question for the USPTO and the courts is to determine the
primary significance of the designation.316 Accordingly, all genericness cases
must ultimately determine whether consumers perceive the designation as
identifying a class or type of product or service (in which case it is generic) or
the producer of the product or service (in which case it is not generic).317
Because consumer perception is the central issue in genericness cases,
parties often offer survey evidence, but courts also rely on evidence of how the
media, the public, and the parties have used the term.318 Surveys are not essential
if other evidence strongly supports a party’s position, but some courts state a
preference for survey evidence over other forms of evidence in genericness
cases.319 Meanwhile, other courts and the TTAB have held that surveys are only
312
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a); see also Colt Defense LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 705–06
(1st Cir. 2007).
313
See Loglan Inst., Inc. v. Logical Language Grp., Inc., 962 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
314
See Horizon Mills Corp. v. QVC, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 208, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that the
general public’s perception, not the perception of trade professionals and fashion experts, is relevant to whether
SLINKY is generic for certain fabric and wearing apparel).
315
See Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Marc Anthony Cosmetics, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1214 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
316
See Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1997).
317
See generally Am. Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1962); E. I.
Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
318
See Magic Wand Inc. v. RDB Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (listing purchaser testimony,
consumer surveys, dictionary definitions, trade journals, newspapers, and other publications).
319
See generally, e.g., Nartron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 397, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2002);
Booking.com B.V. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 915 F.3d 171, 183 (4th Cir. 2019); Berner Int’l Corp. v.
Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982–83 (3d Cir. 1993).
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valid when assessing whether a coined or arbitrary trademark has become a
generic term through popular usage, and not when assessing genericness of an
ordinary term or a composite of ordinary terms.320
Comparatively, in the European Union, specifically the United Kingdom,
surveys are inadmissible without the prior approval of a judge. In Interflora v.
Marks and Spencer, plaintiff Interflora conducted a survey and proposed calling
survey respondents as witnesses.321 The High Court allowed the evidence, but
the Court of Appeal overturned this decision.322 The Court of Appeals in
Interflora decided that: (1) a party may conduct a pilot survey without
permission, but at its own risk as to costs; (2) no further survey may be adduced
without the court’s permission and disclosure of the pilot survey; and (3) no
party may adduce evidence from survey respondents without the court’s
permission.323
Conducting surveys poses an entirely new problem regarding who is
surveyed and how to conduct those surveys. First and foremost, conducting a
survey for these purposes is expensive.324 While there is a general understanding
that the price of litigation is immense, trademark litigation makes matters even
worse, exacerbating the financial gap between potential litigants.325 As such, it
is unsurprising that the artists facing off FKC in litigation did not use surveys to
challenge FKC’s Kahlo trademarks by proving that consumers do not associate
Kahlo’s image as a origin indicator pointing to FKC.326 Not only would it be
320
See generally, e.g., Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co., 460 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2006);
Booking.com, 915 F.3d at 183.
321
See Nick Aires, After Interflora, CHARTERED INST. TRADE MARK ATT’YS (2013), https://www.
twobirds.com/~/media/pdfs/news/articles/2013/after-interflora.pdf?la=en; Michael Gardner; UK: Interflora v
M&S–The Saga Continues, MONDAQ (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.mondaq.com/uk/trademark/354104/
interflora-v-ms-the-saga-continues.
322
Id.
323
Aires, supra note 321.
324
See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the monetary and time
investment in consumer surveys); Dan Sarel & Howard Marmorstein, The Effect of Consumer Surveys and
Actual Confusion Evidence in Trademark Litigation: An Empirical Assessment, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1416, 1416
(2009) (“Obtaining any data from consumers, particularly when a properly conducted survey is entailed, is a
complex, time-consuming, and expensive process.”); Robert C. Bird, The Impact of the Moseley Decision on
Trademark Dilution Law, 26 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 102, 104 (2007) (stating that surveys can cost between
$50,000 and $100,000); Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False
Advertising Law, 159 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1339 (2011) (noting that consumer surveys are prohibitively
expensive for smaller businesses).
325
See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Two-Tiered Trademarks, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 295 (2018) (“Today, we
have a two-tiered trademark system. In the upper tier, both parties can afford to litigate. In the lower tier, only
one party can.”).
326
See generally E. Deborah Jay, Genericness Surveys in Trademark Disputes: Evolution of Species, 99
TRADEMARK REP. 1118 (2009).
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expensive but there would be no guarantee of success. This problem reaches new
heights when considered in an international context. Obviously, populations
around the world do not hold a monolithic perspective shared across cultures
regarding what Kahlo’s image represents. For that reason, FKC’s ownership of
the Kahlo trademark streamlines who and what Kahlo represents. In other words,
as Shope and other artists learned, FKC is the gatekeeper to Kahlo’s image and
in doing so crafts Kahlo to whatever it wants—like a white-skinned able-bodied
woman. That is what trademark law has evolved to in today’s globalized
economy. It allows gatekeepers, in the name of market capitalization and anticompletive principles, to manage marks with little concern to the immense
implications that those marks may have. The racist history of trademarks around
the world is not a consequence of antiquated views but a direct result of a
jurisprudence that assumes race-neutrality.
CONCLUSION
Do not forget me, my love.
—Frida Kahlo327

Frida Kahlo trademarks should not exist, and Frida Kahlo should be in the
public domain. This Comment has demonstrated that the litigation over the Frida
Kahlo trademark is nothing more than a squabble premised in the fragmentation
of local and international trademark law regimes that commodify and objectify
marginalized people of color. At the same time, this perspective also raises new
questions ripe for further inquiry. Primarily, what about other peoples’
trademarks? For example, what about Rosa Parks; should a Rosa Parks
trademark exist?328 Then there is Selena Quintanilla, whose shocking death in
1995 lead her father to create a fledgling empire on Selena’s image and likeness
and now utilizes the same tactics as FKC.329 This Comment does not argue that
all cultural icons with trademarks to their name or image should enter the public
domain. Additionally, this Comment does not overlook how trademark or
property law can—and has—protected indigenous cultures and heritages across
the globe.330 The law can, and should, be utilized as a tool by communities to
327
Michelle da Silva Richmond, Long After Her Death, Mexico’s Fiery Artist Still Hot, HARTFORD
COURANT (Sept. 1, 2002), https://www.courant.com/hc-fridafever.artsep01-story.html (quoting Frida Kahlo).
328
See Stephanie D. Zimdahl, A Celebrity Balancing Act: An Analysis of Trademark Protection Under the
Lanham Act and the First Amendment Artistic Expression Defense, 99 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1817 (2005).
329
See generally Jesse Katz, What Would Selena Want?: As Netflix Series Begins, The Battle Over Her
Estate Wages On, BILLBOARD (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/latin/9491686/
selena-estate-legal-battle-netflix-series.
330
See, e.g., Sari Sharoni, The Mark of a Culture: The Efficacy and Propriety of Using Trademark Law to
Deter Cultural Appropriation, 26 FED. CIR. BAR J. 407 (2017); Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela
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protect and defend their culture. The difference between Rosa Parks, Selena
Quintanilla, and Kahlo is who holds the agency, autonomy, and power to make
those decisions. What complicates matters with Kahlo’s trademark are the
numerous competing interests, primarily, what it means to protect Kahlo.
In analyzing Kahlo’s trademarks, this Comment offers another perspective
to the ongoing work in CRT that seeks to reimagine new directions for future
scholarship regarding Critical Race IP and trademark law.331 Let us not forget
that even the treatment of colors—literally colors, like the pinkest pink—under
trademark law is a vivid reminder of how skin color itself can serve as a form of
bankable property.332 Ultimately, trademark law around the globe will remain
focused on the market and securing the investments that applicants make on their
trademarks. As such, marginalized populations will continue to experience
disadvantages time and time again operating within an overtly legal scheme
inherently that rewards entities with familiarity and power, even forcing
marginalized parties to pursue extralegal avenues of relief.333
This Comment furthered the position that Kahlo belongs to the public.334
The ambition of this Comment has been to uncover the inherent racism in local
and international trademark law by examining Kahlo’s trademarks. Nonetheless,
other questions linger: what would have Kahlo wanted? And should that matter?
Looking ahead, it is a given that artists will be better educated, more able to
secure legal representation, and be better informed on how to protect their
rights—in life and in death. Yet, if we are steadily moving toward a situation in
which relatively few global conglomerates are in possession of the vast majority

R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009). See generally SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS
CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 151 (2005) (proposing trademark-like
protection for culture identities in commodified public spaces).
331
See David D. Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual Property,
Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1149–51 (2005) (providing an example of
how a human person can become commodified through intellectual property law through an allegorical business
plan).
332
See Harris, supra note 257, at 1720–21, 1768 (demonstrating how skin color is a marketable and
commodifiable asset and how “protection of the property interest in whiteness is achieved by embracing the
norm of colorblindness”); Deborah R. Gerhardt & Jon M. Lee, Owning Colors, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2483
(2019) (discussing color trademarks). Gerhardt and Lee’s article inspired this Comment’s title.
333
See, e.g., Stephanie B. Turner, The Case of the Zia: Looking beyond Trademark Law to Protect Sacred
Symbols, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 116 (2012) (detailing the shortcoming of the legal system to protect Zia
culture). But see Nicky Woolf, Urban Outfitters settles with Navajo Nation after illegally using tribe’s name,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/18/urban-outfitters-navajonation-settlement (explaining how Navajo country successfully used the legal system to protect its name).
334
Cf. Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 1000 (“I knew I belonged
to the Public and to the world[.]”).
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of the intellectual property resources,335 then there is no question that we are also
moving toward the further marginalization of those who are currently situated at
the edges of the intellectual property system.
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